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Abstract
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years
two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in
detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a new framework
to model belief change. This framework combines temporal and epistemic modalities with a
notion of plausibility, allowing us to examine the change of beliefs over time. In this paper,
we show how belief revision and belief update can be captured in our framework. This
allows us to compare the assumptions made by each method, and to better understand the
principles underlying them. In particular, it shows that Katsuno and Mendelzon’s notion
of belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) depends on several strong assumptions
that may limit its applicability in artificial intelligence. Finally, our analysis allow us to
identify a notion of minimal change that underlies a broad range of belief change operations
including revision and update.
1. Introduction
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and artificial intelligence.
The focus of this research is to understand how an agent should change her beliefs as a result
of getting new information. Two instances of this general phenomenon have been studied
in detail. Belief revision (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makinson, 1985; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988)
focuses on how an agent should change her (set of) beliefs when she adopts a particular
new belief. Belief update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a), on the other hand, focuses on
how an agent should change her beliefs when she realizes that the world has changed. Both
approaches attempt to capture the intuition that an agent should make minimal changes
in her beliefs in order to accommodate the new belief. The difference is that belief revision
attempts to decide what beliefs should be discarded to accommodate a new belief, while
belief update attempts to decide what changes in the world led to the new observation.1
1. Throughout the paper we use “revision” to refer to AGM’s proposal for revision (Alchourro´n et al., 1985)
not as a generic term for the general approach initiated by AGM; similarly, we use “update” to refer to
KM’s proposal for update (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a).
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Belief revision and belief update are two of many possible ways of modeling belief change.
In (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we introduce a general framework for modeling belief
change. We start with the framework for analyzing knowledge in multi-agent systems,
introduced in (Halpern & Fagin, 1989), and add to it a measure of plausibility at each
situation. We then define belief as truth in the most plausible situations. The resulting
framework is very expressive; it captures both time and knowledge as well as beliefs. Having
time allows us to reason in the framework about changes in the beliefs of the agent. It also
allows us to relate the beliefs of the agent about the future with her actual beliefs in the
future. Knowledge captures in a precise sense the non-defeasible information the agent has
about the world, while belief captures the defeasible assumptions implied by her plausibility
assessment. The framework allows us to represent a broad spectrum of notions of belief
change. In this paper, we focus on how, in particular, belief revision and update can be
represented.
We are certainly not the first to provide semantic models for belief revision and update.
For example, (Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Grove, 1988; Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson, 1988; Rott,
1991; Boutilier, 1992; de Rijke, 1992) deal with revision, and (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a;
del Val & Shoham, 1992) deal with update. In fact, there are several works in the literature
that capture both using the same machinery (Katsuno & Satoh, 1991; Goldszmidt & Pearl,
1996; Boutilier, 1998), and others that simulate belief revision using belief update (Grahne,
Mendelzon, & Rieter, 1992; del Val & Shoham, 1994). Our approach is different from most
in that we do not construct a specific framework to capture one or both of these belief
change paradigms. Instead, we start from a natural framework to model how an agent’s
knowledge changes over time and add to it machinery that captures a defeasible notion of
belief.
We believe that our representation offers a number of advantages, and gives a deeper
understanding of both revision and update. For one thing, we show that both revision and
update can be viewed as proceeding by conditioning on initial prior plausibilities. Thus,
our representation emphasizes the role of conditioning as a way of understanding minimal
change. Moreover, it shows that that the major differences between revision and update
can be understood as corresponding to differences in initial beliefs. For example, revision
places full belief on the assumption that the propositions used to describe the world are
static, and do not change their truth value over time. By way of contrast, update allows for
the possibility that propositions change their truth value over time. However, the family of
prior plausibilities that we use to capture update in our framework have the property that
they prefer sequences of events where abnormal events occur as late as possible. Because of
this property, conditioning in update always “explains” observations by recent changes. The
fact that time appears explicitly in our framework allows us to make these issues precise.
In the literature, revision has been viewed as dealing with static worlds (although an
agent’s beliefs may change, the underlying world about which the agent is reasoning does
not) while update has been viewed as dealing with dynamic worlds (see, for example, (Kat-
suno & Mendelzon, 1991a)). We believe that the distinction between static and dynamic
worlds is somewhat misleading. In fact, what is important for revision is not that the world
is static, but that the propositions used to describe the world are static. For example, “At
time 0 the block is on the table” is a static proposition, while “The block is on the table” is
not, since it implicitly references the current state of affairs. (Note that the assumption that
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the propositions are static is not unique to belief revision. Bayesian updating, for example,
makes similar assumptions.) Because we model time explicitly in our framework, we can
examine this issue in more detail. In fact, in Section 7, we show how we relate these two
viewpoints. More precisely, given a system, we replace each proposition p used in the system
by a family of propositions “p is true at time m”, one for each time m. The resulting system
describes exactly the same process as the original system, but from a different linguistic per-
spective. As we show, if the original system corresponds to KM update, then the resulting
system is very close to satisfying the requirements of AGM revision. The only requirement
that is not met is that the prior is totally ordered, or ranked. This requirement, however,
has been relaxed in several variants of revision (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b; Rott, 1992).
Thus, a large part of the difference between revision and update can be understood as a
difference in the language used to describe what is happening.
The generality of our framework forces us to be clear about the assumptions we make
in the process of capturing revision and update. As a consequence, we have to deal with
issues that have been largely ignored by previous semantic accounts. One of these issues
is the status of observations. As we show below, to capture either revision or update, we
have to assume that observations are minimally informative—the only information carried
by an observation of ϕ is that ϕ should be believed. This is a strong assumption, since
most observations carry additional information. For example, when trekking in Nepal,
one does not expect to observe the weather in Boston. If an agent observes that it is in
fact raining in Boston, then this “observation” might well provide extra information about
the world (for example, that cable television is available in Nepal). We remark that in
(Boutilier, Friedman, & Halpern, 1998) there is a treatment of revision in our framework
where observations are allowed to convey additional information.
Finally, our representation makes it clear how the intuitions of revision and update
can be applied in settings where the postulates used to describe them are not sound. For
example, we consider situations where they may be irreversible changes (such as death,
or breaking a glass vase), and where the agent may perform actions beyond just making
observations. Revision and update, as they stand, cannot handle such situations. As we
show, our framework allows us to extend them in a natural way so they do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the
framework we introduced in (Friedman & Halpern, 1997). In Section 3, we give a brief review
of belief revision and belief update. In Section 4, we define a specific class of structures
that embody assumptions that are common to both update and revision. In Section 5,
we describe additional assumptions that are required to capture revision. In Section 6, we
describe the assumptions that are required to capture update. In Section 7, we reexamine
the differences and similarities between belief revision and update. In Section 8, we consider
possible extensions to the setup of revision and update, and discuss how these extensions
can be handled in our framework. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude with a discussion of
related and future work.
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2. The Framework
We now review the framework of Halpern and Fagin (1989) for modeling knowledge, and our
extension of it for dealing with belief change. The reader is encouraged to consult (Fagin,
Halpern, Moses, & Vardi, 1995) for further details and motivation.
2.1 Modeling Knowledge
The framework of Halpern and Fagin was developed to model knowledge in distributed
(i.e., multi-agent) systems (Halpern & Fagin, 1989; Fagin et al., 1995). In this paper, we
restrict our attention to the single agent case. The key assumption in this framework is that
we can characterize the system by describing it in terms of a state that changes over time.
Formally, we assume that at each point in time, the agent is in one of a possibly infinite
set of (local) states. At this point, we do not put any further structure on these states
(although, as we shall see from our examples, when we model situations in a natural way,
states typically do have a great deal of meaningful structure). Intuitively, this local state
encodes the information the agent has observed thus far. There is also an environment,
whose state encodes relevant aspects of the system that are not part of the agent’s local
state.
A global state is a pair (se, sa) consisting of the environment state se and the local state
sa of the agent. A run of the system is a function from time (which, for ease of exposition,
we assume ranges over the natural numbers) to global states. Thus, if r is a run, then
r(0), r(1), . . . is a sequence of global states that, roughly speaking, is a complete description
of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. Given a run r, we can
define two functions re and ra that map from time to states of the environment and the
agent, respectively, by taking re(m) to be the state of the environment in the global state
r(m) and ra(m) to be the agent’s local state in r(m). We can thus identify run r with the
pair of functions 〈re, ra〉. We take a system to consist of a set of runs. Intuitively, these
runs describe all the possible behaviors of the system, that is, all the possible sequences of
events that could occur in the system over time.
Given a system R, we refer to a pair (r,m) consisting of a run r ∈ R and a time m
as a point. We say two points (r,m) and (r′,m′) are indistinguishable to the agent, and
write (r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′), if ra(m) = r
′
a(m
′), i.e., if the agent has the same local state at both
points. Finally, an interpreted system I is a tuple (R, π) consisting of a system R together
with a mapping π that associates with each point a truth assignment to a set Φ of primitive
propositions. In an interpreted system we can talk about an agent’s knowledge: the agent
knows ϕ at a point (r,m) if ϕ holds in all points (r′,m′) such that (r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′).
Intuitively, an agent knows ϕ at (r,m) if ϕ is implied by the information in the local state
ra(m). We give formal semantics for a language of knowledge (and time and plausibility)
in Section 2.3.
Example 2.1: The circuit diagnosis problem has been well studied in the literature (see
(Davis & Hamscher, 1988) for an overview). Consider a circuit that contains n logical
components c1, . . . , cn and k lines l1, . . . , lk. The agent can set the values on the input lines
of the circuit and observe the values on the output lines. The agent then compares the actual
output values to the expected output values and attempts to locate faulty components.
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Since a single test is usually insufficient to locate the problem, the agent might perform a
sequence of such tests.
We want to model diagnosis using an interpreted system. To do so, we need to describe
the agent’s local state, the state of the environment, and some appropriate propositions
for reasoning about diagnosis. Intuitively, the agent’s state is the sequence of input-output
relations observed, while the environment’s state describes the current state of the circuit.
This consists of the failure set , that is, the set of faulty components of the circuit and the
values on all the lines in the circuit. Each run describes the results of a specific series of
tests the agent performs and the results she observes. We make two additional assumptions:
(1) the agent does not forget what tests were performed and their results, and (2) the faults
are persistent and do not change over time.
To make this precise, we define the environment state at a point (r,m) to consist of
the failure set at (r,m), which we denote fault(r,m), as well as the values of all the lines
in the circuit. We require that the environment state be consistent with the description
of the circuit. Thus, for example, if c1 is an AND gate with input lines l1 and l2 and
output line l3, then if re(m) says that c1 is not faulty, then we require that there is a
1 on l3 if and only if there is a 1 on both l1 and l2.
2 We capture the assumption that
faults are persistent by requiring that fault(r,m) = fault(r, 0). For our later results, it is
useful to describe the agent’s observations using our logical language. Consider the set
Φdiag = {f1, . . . , fn, h1, . . . , hk} of primitive propositions, where fi denotes that component
i is faulty and hi denotes that there is a 1 on line i (that is, line i in a “high” state). An
observation is a conjunction of literals of the form hi and ¬hi. The agent’s state at time
m is a sequence of m such observations. Formally, we define the agent’s state ra(m) to
be 〈o1, . . . , om〉, where, intuitively, ok is the formula describing the input-output relation
observed at time k. We use the notation io(r, k) to denote the formula describing the
observation made by the agent at the point (r, k). Given this language, we can define the
interpretation πdiag in the obvious way. We say that an observation o is consistent with an
environment state re(m) if the states of the input/output lines in re(m) agree with these in
o. The system Rdiag consists of all runs r satisfying these requirements in which io(r,m) is
consistent with re(m) for all times m.
Given the system (Rdiag, πdiag), we can examine the agent’s knowledge after making a
sequence of observations o1, . . . , om. It is easy to see that the agent knows that the fault set
must be one with which all the observations are consistent. However, the agent cannot rule
out any of these fault sets. Thus, even if all the observations are consistent with the circuit
being fault-free, the agent does not know that the circuit is fault-free, since there might be
a fault that manifests itself only in configurations that have not yet been tested. Of course,
the agent might strongly believe that the circuit is fault-free, but we cannot (yet) express
this fact in our formalism. The next section rectifies this problem. ⊓⊔
2. Note that this means that we can recover the behavior of the circuit (although not necessarily its exact
description) by simply looking at the environment state at a point where there are no failures. Of course, if
we could have a yet richer environment state that encodes the actual description of the circuit, but this is
unnecessary for the analysis we do here.
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2.2 Plausibility Measures
Most non-probabilistic approaches to belief change require (explicitly or implicitly) that
the agent has some ordering over possible alternatives. For example, the agent might
have a preference ordering over possible worlds (Boutilier, 1994b; Grove, 1988; Katsuno &
Mendelzon, 1991b) or an entrenchment ordering over formulas (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson,
1988). This ordering dictates how the agent’s beliefs change. For example, in (Grove, 1988),
the new beliefs are characterized by the most preferred worlds that are consistent with the
new observation, while in (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson, 1988), beliefs are discarded according
to their degree of entrenchment until it is consistent to add the new observation to the
resulting set of beliefs. We represent this ordering using plausibility measures, which were
introduced in (Friedman & Halpern, 1995, 1998b). We briefly review the relevant definitions
and results here.
Recall that a probability space is a tuple (W,F ,Pr), where W is a set of worlds, F is
an algebra of measurable subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed under union and
complementation to which we assign probability), and Pr is a probability measure, that is, a
function mapping each set in F to a number in [0, 1] satisfying the well-known probability
axioms (Pr(∅) = 0, Pr(W ) = 1, and Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A and B are disjoint).
Plausibility spaces are a direct generalization of probability spaces. We simply replace
the probability measure Pr by a plausibility measure Pl, which, rather than mapping sets in
F to numbers in [0, 1], maps them to elements in some arbitrary partially ordered set. We
read Pl(A) as “the plausibility of set A”. If Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B), then B is at least as plausible
as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W,F ,Pl), where W is a set of worlds, F
is an algebra of subsets ofW , and Pl maps sets in F to some domain D of plausibility values
partially ordered by a relation ≤D (so that ≤D is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric).
We assume that D is pointed : that is, it contains two special elements ⊤D, and ⊥D such
that ⊥D≤D d ≤D ⊤D for all d ∈ D; we further assume that Pl(W ) = ⊤D and Pl(∅) =⊥D.
As usual, we define the ordering <D by taking d1 <D d2 if d1 ≤D d2 and d1 6= d2. We omit
the subscript D from ≤D, <D, ⊤D, and ⊥D whenever it is clear from context.
Since we want a set to be at least as plausible as any of its subsets, we require
A1 If A ⊆ B, then Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B).
Some brief remarks on this definition: We have deliberately suppressed the domain D
from the tuple S, since for the purposes of this paper, only the ordering induced by ≤ on
the subsets in F is relevant. The algebra F also does not play a significant role in this
paper. Unless we say otherwise, we assume F contains all subsets of interest and suppress
mention of F , denoting a plausibility space as a pair (W,Pl).
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. In (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b,
1995) we show that they also generalize belief function (Shafer, 1976), fuzzy measures (Wang
& Klir, 1992), possibility measures (Dubois & Prade, 1990), ordinal ranking (or κ-ranking)
(Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1996; Spohn, 1988), preference orderings (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magi-
dor, 1990; Shoham, 1987), and parameterized probability distributions (Goldszmidt, Morris,
& Pearl, 1993) that are used as a basis for Pearl’s ǫ-semantics for defaults (Pearl, 1989).
Our goal is to describe the agent’s beliefs in terms of plausibility. To do this, we describe
how to evaluate statements of the form Bϕ given a plausibility space. In fact, we use a
richer logical language that also allows us to describe how the agent compares different
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alternatives. This is the logic of conditionals. Conditionals are statements of the form
ϕ→ψ, read “given ϕ, ψ is plausible” or “given ϕ, then by default ψ”. The syntax of the
logic of conditionals is simple: we start with primitive propositions and close off under
conjunction, negation and the modal operator →. The resulting language is denoted LC .
A plausibility structure is a tuple PL = (W,Pl, π), where W is a set of possible worlds,
Pl is a plausibility measure onW , and π(w) is a truth assignment to primitive propositions.
Given a plausibility structure PL = (W,Pl, π), we define [[ϕ]]PL = {w ∈ W : π(w) |= ϕ} to
be the set of worlds that satisfy ϕ. We omit the subscript PL, when it is clear from the
context. Conditionals are evaluated according to a rule that is essentially the same as the
one used by Dubois and Prade (1991) to evaluate conditionals using possibility measures:
• PL |= ϕ→ψ if either Pl([[ϕ]]) =⊥ or Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) > Pl([[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]]).
Intuitively, ϕ→ψ holds vacuously if ϕ is impossible; otherwise, it holds if ϕ ∧ ψ is more
plausible than ϕ ∧ ¬ψ. As we show in (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b), this semantics of
conditionals also generalizes the semantics of conditionals in κ-ranking (Goldszmidt & Pearl,
1996), and PPD structures (Goldszmidt et al., 1993). As we also show in (Friedman &
Halpern, 1998b), this semantics for conditionals generalizes the semantics of preferential
structures. As this relationship plays a role in the discussion below, we review the necessary
definitions here. A preferential structure is a tuple (W,≺, π), where ≺ is a partial order
on W . Roughly speaking, w ≺ w′ holds if w is preferred to w′.3 The intuition (Shoham,
1987) is that a preferential structure satisfies a conditional ϕ→ψ if all the most preferred
worlds (i.e., the minimal worlds according to ≺) in [[ϕ]] satisfy ψ. However, there may be
no minimal worlds in [[ϕ]]. This can happen if [[ϕ]] contains an infinite descending sequence
. . . ≺ w2 ≺ w1. What do we do in these structures? There are a number of options: the first
is to assume that, for each formula ϕ, there are minimal worlds in [[ϕ]]; this is the assumption
actually made in (Kraus et al., 1990), where it is called the smoothness assumption. A yet
more general definition—one that works even if ≺ is not smooth—is given in (Lewis, 1973;
Boutilier, 1994a). Roughly speaking, ϕ→ψ is true if, from a certain point on, whenever ϕ
is true, so is ψ. More formally,
(W,≺, π) satisfies ϕ→ψ, if for every world w1 ∈ [[ϕ]], there is a world w2 such
that (a) w2  w1 (so that w2 is at least as normal as w1), (b) w2 ∈ [[ϕ∧ψ]], and
(c) for all worlds w3 ≺ w2, we have w3 ∈ [[ϕ ⇒ ψ]] (so any world more normal
than w2 that satisfies ϕ also satisfies ψ).
It is easy to verify that this definition is equivalent to the earlier one if ≺ is smooth.
Proposition 2.2 : (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b) If ≺ is a preference ordering on W ,
then there is a plausibility measure Pl≺ on W such that (W,≺, π) |= ϕ→ψ if and only if
(W,Pl≺, π) |= ϕ→ψ.
We briefly describe the construction of Pl≺ here, since we use it in the sequel. Given
a preference order ≺ on W , let D0 be the domain of plausibility values consisting of one
3. We follow the standard notation for preference here (Kraus et al., 1990), which uses the (perhaps confusing)
convention of placing the more likely (or less abnormal) world on the left of the ≺ operator. Unfortunately,
when translated to plausibility, this will mean w ≺ w′ holds iff Pl({w} > Pl({w′}).
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element dw for every element w ∈ W . We define a partial order on D0 using ≺: dv < dw
if w ≺ v. (Recall that w ≺ w′ denotes that w is preferred to w′.) We then take D to be
the smallest set containing D0 that is closed under least upper bounds (so that every set
of elements in D has a least upper bound in D). For a subset A of W , we can then define
Pl≺(A) to be the least upper bound of {dw : w ∈ A}. Since D is closed under least upper
bounds, Pl(A) is well defined. As we show in (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b), this choice of
Pl≺ satisfies Proposition 2.2.
The results of (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b) show that this semantics for conditionals
generalizes previous semantics for conditionals. Does this semantics capture our intuitions
about conditionals? In the AI literature, there has been little consensus on the “right”
properties for defaults (which are essentially conditionals). However, there has been some
consensus on a reasonable “core” of inference rules for default reasoning. This core is usually
known as the KLM properties (Kraus et al., 1990), and includes such properties as
AND From ϕ→ψ1 and ϕ→ψ2 infer ϕ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2
OR From ϕ1→ψ and ϕ2→ψ infer ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2→ψ
What constraints on plausibility spaces gives us the KLM properties? Consider the following
two conditions:
A2 If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl(A∪B) > Pl(C), and Pl(A∪C) >
Pl(B), then Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪C).
A3 If Pl(A) = Pl(B) =⊥, then Pl(A ∪B) =⊥.
A plausibility space (W,Pl) is qualitative if it satisfies A2 and A3. A plausibility struc-
ture (W,Pl, π) is qualitative if (W,Pl) is a qualitative plausibility space. In (Friedman &
Halpern, 1998b), we show that, in a very general sense, qualitative plausibility structures
capture default reasoning. More precisely, we show that the KLM properties are sound
with respect to a class of plausibility structures if and only if the class consists of qualita-
tive plausibility structures. (We also provide a weak condition that we show is necessary
and sufficient for the KLM properties to be complete.) These results show that plausibility
structures provide a unifying framework for the characterization of default entailment in
these different logics.
2.3 Plausibility and Knowledge
In (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) we show how plausibility measures can be incorporated into
the multi-agent system framework of (Halpern & Fagin, 1989). This allows us to describe
the agent’s assessment of the possible states the system is in at each point in time. At the
same time we also introduce conditionals into the logical language in order to reason about
these plausibility assessments. We now review the relevant details.
An (interpreted) plausibility system is a tuple (R, π,P) where, as before, R is a set
of runs and π maps each point to a truth assignment, and where P is a plausibility as-
signment function mapping each point (r,m) to a qualitative plausibility space P(r,m) =
(W(r,m),Pl(r,m)). Intuitively, the plausibility space P(r,m) describes the relative plausibil-
ity of events from the point of view of the agent at (r,m). In this paper, we restrict our
attention to plausibility spaces that satisfy two additional assumptions:
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• W(r,m) = {(r
′,m′)|(r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′)}. Thus, the agent considers plausible only situa-
tions that are possible according to her knowledge.
• if (r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′) then P(r,m) = P(r′,m′). This means that the plausibility space
is a function of the agent’s local state.4
We define a logical language to reason about interpreted systems. The syntax of the logic
is simple; we start with primitive propositions and close off under conjunction, negation,
the K modal operator (Kϕ says that the agent knows ϕ), the © modal operator (©ϕ says
that ϕ is true at the next time step), and the → modal operator. The resulting language
is denoted LKPT.5 We recursively assign truth values to formulas in LKPT at a point (r,m)
in a plausibility system I. The truth of primitive propositions is determined by π, so that
(I, r,m) |= p if π(r,m)(p) = true.
Conjunction and negation are treated in the standard way, as is knowledge: The agent
knows ϕ at (r,m) if ϕ holds at all points that she cannot distinguish from (r,m). Thus,
(I, r,m) |= Kϕ if (I, r′,m′) |= ϕ for all (r′,m′) ∼a (r,m).
©ϕ is true at (r,m) if ϕ is true at (r,m+ 1). Thus,
(I, r,m) |= ©ϕ if (I, r,m+ 1) |= ϕ.
Finally, we define the conditional operator → to describe the agent’s plausibility assessment
at the current time. Let [[ϕ]](r,m) = {(r
′,m′) ∈W(r,m) : (I, r,m) |= ϕ}.
(I, r,m) |= ϕ→ψ if either Pl(r,m)([[ϕ]](r,m)) = ⊥ or Pl(r,m)([[ϕ ∧ ψ]](r,m)) > Pl(r,m)([[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]](r,m)).
We now define a notion of belief. Intuitively, the agent believes ϕ if ϕ is more plausible
than not. Formally, we define Bϕ⇔ (true→ϕ).
In (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) we prove that, in this framework, knowledge is an S5
operator, the conditional operator→ satisfies the usual axioms of conditional logic (Burgess,
1981), and © satisfies the usual properties of temporal logic (Manna & Pnueli, 1992). In
addition, these properties imply that belief is a K45 operator, and the interactions between
knowledge and belief are captured by the axioms Kϕ⇒ Bϕ and Bϕ⇒ KBϕ.
Example 2.3: (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) We add a plausibility measure to the system
defined in Example 2.1. We define Idiag = (Rdiag, πdiag,Pdiag), where Pdiag is the plausi-
bility assignment we now describe. We assume that failures of individual components are
independent of one another. If we also assume that the likelihood of each component failing
is the same, and also that this likelihood is small (i.e., failures are exceptional), then we
can construct a plausibility measure as follows. If (r′,m) and (r′′,m) are two points in
W(r,m), we say that (r
′,m) is more plausible than (r′′,m) if |fault(r′,m)| < |fault(r′′,m)|,
4. The framework presented in (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) is more general than this, dealing with multiple
agents and allowing the agent to consider several plausibility spaces in each local state. The simplified
version we present here suffices to capture belief revision and update.
5. It is easy to add other temporal modalities such as until, eventually, since, etc. These do not play a role in
this paper.
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that is, if the failure set at (r′,m) consists of fewer faulty components than at (r′′,m). We
extend these comparisons to sets: Pl(r,m)(A) ≤ Pl(r,m)(B) if min(r′,m)∈A(|fault(r
′,m)|) ≥
min(r′,m)∈B(|fault(r
′,m)|); that is, A is less plausible if all the points in A have failure sets
of larger cardinality then the minimal one in B. With this plausibility measure, if all of
the agent’s observations up to time m are consistent with there being no failures, then
the agent believes that all components are functioning correctly. On the other hand, if
the observations do not match the expected output of the circuit, then the agent considers
minimal failure sets that are consistent with her observations. Thus, if the observations are
consistent with a failure of c1, or a failure of c3, or the combined failure of c2 and c7, then
the agent believes that either c1 or c3 is faulty, but not both.
We now make this more precise. A failure set (i.e., a diagnosis) is characterized by a
complete formula over f1, . . . , fn—that is, one that determines the truth values all these
propositions. For example, if n = 3, then f1∧¬f2∧¬f3 characterizes the failure set {c1}. We
define D(r,m) to be the set of failure sets (i.e., diagnoses) that the agent considers possible
at (r,m); that is D(r,m) = {f ∈ F : (Idiag, r,m) |= ¬B¬f} where F is the set of all possible
failure sets.
Belief change in Idiag is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4: If there is some f ∈ D(r,m) that is consistent with the new observation
io(r,m + 1), then D(r,m+1) consists of all the failure sets in D(r,m) that are consistent with
io(r,m+1). If all f ∈ D(r,m) are inconsistent with io(r,m+1), then D(r,m+1) consists of all
failure sets of cardinality j that are consistent with io(r, 1), . . . , io(r,m + 1), where j is the
least cardinality for which there is at least one failure set consistent with these observations.
Thus, in Idiag, a new observation consistent with the current set of most likely explanations
reduces this set (to those consistent with the new observation). On the other hand, a
surprising observation (one inconsistent with the current set of most likely explanations)
has a rather drastic effect. It easily follows from Proposition 2.4 that if io(r,m + 1) is
surprising, then D(r,m) ∩ D(r,m+1) = ∅, so the agent discards all her current explanations
in this case. Moreover, an easy induction on m shows that if D(r,m) ∩D(r,m+1) = ∅, then
the cardinality of the failure sets in D(r,m+1) is greater than the cardinality of failure sets
in D(r,m). Thus, in this case, the explanations in D(r,m+1) are more complicated than those
in D(r,m). ⊓⊔
2.4 Conditioning
In an interpreted system, the agent’s beliefs change from point to point as her plausibility
space changes. The general framework does not put any constraints on how the plausibility
space changes. If we were thinking probabilistically, we could imagine the agent starting
with a prior on the runs in the system. Since a run describes a complete history over
time, this means that the agent puts a prior probability on the possible sequences of events
that could happen. We would then expect the agent to modify her prior by conditioning
on whatever information she has learned. As we show below, this notion of conditioning is
closely related to belief revision and update. We remark that we are not the first to applying
conditioning in the context of belief change (cf. (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1996; Spohn, 1988));
the details are a little more complex in our framework, because we model time explicitly.
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We start by making the simplifying assumption that we are dealing with synchronous
systems where agents have perfect recall (Halpern & Vardi, 1989). Intuitively, this means
that the agent knows what the time is and does not forget the observations she has made.
Formally, a system is synchronous if (r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′) only if m = m′. In synchronous
systems, the agent has perfect recall if (r′,m + 1) ∼a (r,m + 1) implies (r
′,m) ∼a (r,m).
Thus, the agent considers run r possible at the point (r,m + 1) only if she also considers
it possible at (r,m). This means that any runs considered impossible at (r,m) are also
considered impossible at (r,m + 1): the agent does not forget what she knew.
Just as with probability, we assume that the agent has a prior plausibility measure on
runs that describes her prior assessment on the possible executions of the system. As the
agent gains knowledge, she updates her prior by conditioning. More precisely, at each point
(r,m), the agent conditions her previous assessment on the set of runs considered possible
at (r,m). This results in an updated assessment (posterior) of the plausibility of runs. This
posterior induces, via a projection from runs to points, a plausibility measure on points.
We can think of the agent’s posterior at time m as simply her prior conditioned on her
knowledge at time m.
Formally, the prior plausibility of the agent is a plausibility measure Pa = (R,Pla) over
the runs in the system. If A is a set of points, we define R(A) = {r : ∃m((r,m) ∈ A)} to be
the set of runs on which the points in A lie. The agent updates plausibilities by conditioning
in I if the following condition is met:
PRIOR There is prior Pa = (R,Pla) such that for all runs r ∈ R, times m,
and sets A,B ⊆ W(r,m), Pl(r,m)(A) ≤ Pl(r,m)(B) if and only if Pla(R(A)) ≤
Pla(R(B)).
This definition implies that the agent’s plausibility assessment at each point is determined,
in a straightforward fashion, by her prior.
As shown in (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), in synchronous systems that satisfy PRIOR
where agent have perfect recall, we can say even more: the agent’s plausibility measure at
time m+1 is determined by her plausibility measure at time m. To make this precise, if A
is a set of points, let prev(A) = {(r,m) : (r,m+ 1) ∈ A}.
Theorem 2.5: (Friedman & Halpern, 1997). Let I be a synchronous system satisfying
PRIOR where agents have perfect recall. Then Pl(r,m+1)(A) ≤ Pl(r,m+1)(B) if and only if
Pl(r,m)(prev(A)) ≤ Pl(r,m)(prev(B)), for all runs r, times m, and sets A,B ⊆W(r,m+1).
Thus, in synchronous systems where agents have perfect recall PRIOR implies a “local”
rule for update that incrementally changes the agent’s plausibility at each step. This local
rule consists of two steps. First, the agent’s plausibility at time m is projected to time
m+1 points. Second, time m+1 points that are inconsistent with the agent knowledge at
(r,m+1) are discarded. This procedure implies that the relative plausibility of two sets of
runs does not change unless one of them is incompatible with the new knowledge.
Example 2.6: It is easy to verify that the system Idiag we consider in Example 2.3 satisfies
PRIOR. The prior Pa is determined by the failure set in each run in a manner similar to
the construction of Pl(r,m). That is, R1 is more plausible than R2 if there is a run in R1
with a smaller failure set than all the runs in R2. ⊓⊔
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3. Review of Revision and Update
We now present a brief review of belief revision and update.
Belief revision attempts to describe how a rational agent incorporates new beliefs. As
we said earlier, the main intuition is that as few changes as possible should be made. Thus,
when something is learned that is consistent with earlier beliefs, it is just added to the set of
beliefs. The more interesting situation is when the agent learns something inconsistent with
her current beliefs. She must then discard some of her old beliefs in order to incorporate
the new belief and remain consistent. The question is which ones?
The most widely accepted notion of belief revision is defined by the AGM theory (Al-
chourro´n et al., 1985; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988). This theory was originally developed in philosophy
of science, where one attempts to understand when a scientist changes her beliefs (e.g., the-
ory of physical laws) in a rational manner. In this context, it seems reasonable to assume
that the world is static; that is, the laws of physics do not change while the scientist is
performing experiments.
Formally, this theory assumes a logical language Le over a set Φe of primitive proposi-
tions with a consequence relation ⊢Le that contains the propositional calculus and satisfies
the deduction theorem. The AGM approach assumes that an agent’s epistemic state is
represented by a belief set, that is, a set K of formulas in the language Le.
6 There is also
assumed to be a revision operator ◦ that takes a belief set A and a formula ϕ and returns a
new belief set A◦ϕ, intuitively, the result of revising A by ϕ. The following AGM postulates
are an attempt to characterize the intuition of “minimal change”:
(R1) A ◦ ϕ is a belief set
(R2) ϕ ∈ A ◦ ϕ
(R3) A ◦ ϕ ⊆ Cl(A ∪ {ϕ})7
(R4) If ¬ϕ 6∈ A then Cl(A ∪ {ϕ}) ⊆ A ◦ ϕ
(R5) A ◦ ϕ = Cl(false) if and only if ⊢Le ¬ϕ
(R6) If ⊢Le ϕ⇔ ψ then A ◦ ϕ = A ◦ ψ
(R7) A ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cl(A ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ})
(R8) If ¬ψ 6∈ A ◦ ϕ then Cl(A ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ A ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ).
The essence of these postulates is the following. After a revision by ϕ the belief set
should include ϕ (postulates R1 and R2). If the new belief is consistent with the belief set,
then the revision should not remove any of the old beliefs and should not add any new beliefs
except these implied by the combination of the old beliefs with the new belief (postulates
R3 and R4). This condition is called persistence. The next two conditions discuss the
coherence of beliefs. Postulate R5 states that the agent is capable of incorporating any
consistent belief and postulate R6 states that the syntactic form of the new belief does
not affect the revision process. The last two postulates enforce a certain coherency on the
6. For example, Ga¨rdenfors (1988, p. 21) says “A simple way of modeling the epistemic state of an individual
is to represent it by a set of sentences.”
7. Cl(A) = {ϕ|A ⊢Le ϕ} is the deductive closure of a set of formulas A.
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outcome of revisions by related beliefs. Basically, they state that if ψ is consistent with
A ◦ ϕ then A ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ) is just A ◦ ϕ ◦ ψ.
The notion of belief update originated in the database community (Keller & Winslett,
1985; Winslett, 1988). The problem is how a knowledge base should change when something
is learned about the world. For example, suppose that a transaction adds to the knowledge
base the fact “Table 7 is in Office 2”, which contradicts the previous belief that “Table 7
is in Office 1”. What else should change? The intuition that update attempts to capture
is that such a transaction describes a change that has occurred in the world. Thus, in our
example, by applying update we might conclude that the reason that the table is in Office
2 is that it was moved, not that our earlier beliefs were false. This example shows that,
unlike revision, update does not assume that the world is static.
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991a) suggest a set of postulates that an update operator
should satisfy. The update postulates are expressed in terms of formulas, not belief sets.
That is, an update operator ⋄ maps a pair of formulas, one describing the agent’s current
beliefs and the other describing the new observation, to a new formula that describes the
agent’s updated beliefs. This is not unreasonable, since we can identify a formula ϕ with
the belief set Cl(ϕ). Indeed, if Φ is finite (which is what Katsuno and Mendelzon assume)
every belief set A can be associated with some formula ϕA such that Cl(ϕA) = A, and
every formula ϕ corresponds to a belief set Cl(ϕ). Thus, any update operator induces an
operator that maps a belief state and an observation to a new belief state. We slightly
abuse notation and use the same symbol to denote both types of mappings. We say that
a belief set A is complete if, for every ϕ ∈ Le, either ϕ ∈ A or ¬ϕ ∈ A. A formula µ is
complete if Cl(µ) is complete.
The KM postulates are:
(U1) ⊢Le µ ⋄ ϕ⇒ ϕ
(U2) If ⊢Le µ⇒ ϕ, then ⊢Le µ ⋄ ϕ⇔ µ
(U3) ⊢Le ¬µ ⋄ ϕ if and only if ⊢Le ¬µ or ⊢Le ¬ϕ
(U4) If ⊢Le µ1 ⇔ µ2 and ⊢Le ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2 then ⊢Le µ1 ⋄ ϕ1 ⇔ µ2 ⋄ ϕ2
(U5) ⊢Le (µ ⋄ ϕ) ∧ ψ ⇒ µ ⋄ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
(U6) If ⊢Le µ ⋄ ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 and ⊢Le µ ⋄ ϕ2 ⇒ ϕ1, then ⊢Le µ ⋄ ϕ1 ⇔ µ ⋄ ϕ2
(U7) If µ is complete then ⊢Le (µ ⋄ ϕ1) ∧ (µ ⋄ ϕ2)⇒ µ ⋄ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
(U8) ⊢Le (µ1 ∨ µ2) ⋄ ϕ⇔ (µ1 ⋄ ϕ) ∨ (µ2 ⋄ ϕ).
The essence of these postulates is as following. After learning ϕ, the agent believes ϕ
(postulate U1, which is analogous to R2). If ϕ is already believed, then updating by ϕ does
not change the agent’s beliefs (postulate U2, which is a weaker version of R3 and R4). The
next two postulates (U3 and U4) deal with coherence of the belief change process. They
are analogous to R5 and R6, respectively, with minor differences. Postulates U5 and U6
deal with observations that are related to each other. U5 states that beliefs after learning
ϕ that are consistent with ψ are also believed after learning ϕ ∧ ψ. U6 states that if ϕ2 is
believed after learning ϕ1 and ϕ1 is believed after learning ϕ2, then learning either ϕ1 or
ϕ2 leads to the same belief set. Finally, U7 and U8 deal with decomposition properties of
the update operation. U7 states that if µ is essentially a truth assignment to L, then if ψ
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is believed after learning ϕ1 and is also believed after learning ϕ2 then it is believed after
learning ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. U8 states that the update of the knowledge base can be computed by
independent updates on each sub-part of the knowledge. That is, if µ = µ1 ∨ µ2, then we
can apply update to each of µ1 and µ2, and then combine the results.
4. Belief Change Systems
We want to model belief change—particularly belief revision and belief update—in the
framework of systems. To do so, we consider a particular class of systems that we call
belief change systems. In belief change systems, the agent makes observations about an
external environment. Just as is (implicitly) assumed in both revision and update, we
assume that these observations are described by formulas in some logical language. We
then make other assumptions regarding the plausibility measure used by the agent. We
formalize our assumptions as conditions BCS1–BCS5, described below, and say that a
system I = (R, π,P) is a belief change system if it satisfies these conditions. We denote by
CBCS the set of belief change systems.
Assumption BCS1 formalizes the intuition that our language includes propositions for
reasoning about the environment, whose truth depends only on the environment state.
BCS1 The language L includes a propositional sublanguage Le over a set Φe
of primitive propositions. Le contains the usual propositional connectives and
comes equipped with a consequence relation ⊢Le . The interpretation π(r,m)
assigns truth to propositions in Φe in such a way that
(a) π(r,m) is consistent with ⊢Le, that is, {p : p ∈ Φe, π(r,m)(p) = true} ∪
{¬p : p ∈ Φe, π(r,m)(p) = false} is ⊢Le consistent, and
(b) π(r,m)(p) depends only on re(m) for propositions in Φe; that is, π(r,m)(p) =
π(r′,m′)(p) whenever re(m) = r
′
e(m
′).
Part (b) of BCS1 implies that we can evaluate formulas in Le with respect to environment
states; that is, if ϕ ∈ Le and re(m) = r
′
e(m
′), then (I, r,m) |= ϕ if and only if (I, r′,m′) |= ϕ.
Since the environment is all that is relevant for formulas in Le, if ϕ ∈ Le, we write se |= ϕ
if (I, r,m) |= ϕ for some point (r,m) such that re(m) = se.
BCS2 is concerned with the form of the agent’s local state. Recall that, in our framework,
the local state captures the relevant aspects of the agent’s epistemic state. The functional
form of the revision and update operators suggests that all that matters regarding how an
agent changes her beliefs are the agent’s current epistemic state (which is taken by both
AGM and KM to be a belief set) and what is learned. In terms of our framework, this
suggests that agent’s local state at time m + 1 should be a function of her local state of
time m and the observation made at time m. We in fact make the stronger assumption
here that the agent’s state consists of the sequence of observations made by the agent. This
means that the agent remembers all her past observations. Note that this surely implies
that the agent’s local state at time m + 1 is determined by her state at time m and the
observation made at time m. We make the further assumption that the observations made
by the agent can be described by formulas in Le. Although this is quite a strong assumption
on the expressive power of Le, it is standard in the literature: both revision and update
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assume that observations can be expressed as formulas in the language (see Section 3).
These assumptions are formalized in BCS2:
BCS2 For all r ∈ R and for all m, we have ra(m) = 〈o(r,1), . . . , o(r,m)〉 where
o(r,k) ∈ Le for 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
Intuitively, o(r,k) is the observation the agent makes immediately after the transition from
time k − 1 to time k in run r. Thus, it represents what the agent observes about the new
state of the system at time k. Note that BCS2 implies that the agent’s state at time 0 is the
empty sequence in all runs. Moreover, it implies that ra(m+ 1) = ra(m) · o(r,m+1), where ·
is the append operation on sequences. That is, the agent’s state at (r,m + 1) is the result
of appending to her previous state the latest observation she has made about the system.
It is not too hard to show that belief change systems are synchronous and agents in them
have perfect recall. (We remark that the agents’ local states are modeled in a similar way
in the model of knowledge bases presented in (Fagin et al., 1995).)
Clearly we want to reason in our language about the observations the agent makes.
Thus, we assume that the language includes propositions that describe the observations
made by the agent.
BCS3 The language L includes a set Φobs of primitive propositions disjoint
from Φe such that Φobs = {learn(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ Le}. Moreover, π(r,m)(learn(ϕ)) =
true if and only if o(r,m) = ϕ for all runs r and times m.
In a system satisfying BCS1–BCS3, we can talk about belief change. The agent’s state
encodes observations, and we have propositions that allow us to talk about what is observed.
The next assumption is somewhat more geared to situations where observations are always
“accepted”, so that after the agent observes ϕ, she believes ϕ. While this is not a necessary
assumption, it is made by both belief revision and belief update. We capture this assumption
here in what is perhaps the simplest possible way: by assuming that observations are
reliable, so that the agent observes ϕ only if the current state of the environment satisfies
ϕ. This is certainly not the only way of enforcing the assumption that observations are
accepted, but it is perhaps the simplest, so we focus on it here. As we shall see, this
assumption is consistent with both revision and update, in the sense that we can capture
both in systems satisfying it.
BCS4 (I, r,m) |= o(r,m) for all runs r and times m.
Note that BCS4 implies that the agent never observes false. Moreover, it implies that after
observing ϕ, the agent knows that ϕ is true. In (Boutilier et al., 1998), we consider an
instance of our framework in which observations are unreliable (so that BCS4 does not hold
in general), and examine the status of R2, the acceptance postulate, in this case.
Finally, we assume that belief change proceeds by conditioning. While there are certainly
other assumptions that can be made, as we have tried to argue, conditioning is a principled
approach that captures the intuitions of minimal change, given the observations. And, as
we shall see, conditioning (as captured by PRIOR) is consistent with both revision and
update.
BCS5 I satisfies PRIOR.
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Many interesting systems can be viewed as BCS’s.
Example 4.1: Consider the systems Idiag,1 and Idiag,2 of Example 2.1. Are these systems
BCSs? Not quite, since πdiag is not defined on primitive propositions of the form learn(ϕ),
but we can easily embed both systems in a BCS. Let Ldiag the propositional language defined
over Φdiag, and let Φ
+
diag consist of Φdiag together with all the primitive propositions of the
form learn(ϕ) for ϕ ∈ Ldiag. Let π
+
diag be the obvious extension of πdiag to Φ
+
diag, defined so
that BCS3 holds. Then in it is easy to see that (Rdiag, π
+
diag,Pdiag,i) is a BCS: we take the
Φe of BCS1 to be Φdiag, and define ⊢Ldiag so that it enforces the relationships determined
by the circuit layout. Thus, for example, if c1 is an AND gate with input lines l1 and l2
and output line l3, then we would have ⊢Ldiag ¬f1 ⇒ (h3 ⇔ h1 ∧ h2). It is then easy to see
that BCS2–BCS5 hold by our construction. ⊓⊔
These definitions set the background for our presentation of belief revision and belief
update.
5. Capturing Revision
Revision can be captured by restricting to BCSs that satisfy several additional assump-
tions. Before describing these assumptions, we briefly review a well-known representation
of revision that will help motivate them.
While there are several representation theorems for belief revision, the clearest is perhaps
the following (Grove, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b). We associate with each belief
set A a set WA of possible worlds that consists of those worlds where A is true. Thus, an
agent whose belief set is A believes that one of the worlds inWA is the real world. An agent
that performs belief revision behaves as though in each belief state A she has a ranking ,
i.e., a total preorder, over all possible worlds such that the minimal (i.e., most plausible)
worlds in the ranking are exactly those in WA. When revising by ϕ, the agent chooses the
minimal worlds satisfying ϕ in the ranking and constructs a belief set from them. It is easy
to see that this procedure for belief revision satisfies the AGM postulates. Moreover, in
(Grove, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b), it is shown that any belief revision operator
can be described in terms of such a ranking.
This representation suggests how we can capture belief revision in our framework. We
define CR ⊆ CBCS to be the set of belief change systems I = (R, π,P) that satisfy the
conditions REV1–REV4 that we define below.
Revision assumes that the world does not change during the revision process. For-
mally this implies that propositions in Φe do not change their truth value along a run,
i.e., (I, r,m) |= p if and only if (I, r,m + 1) |= p for all p ∈ Φe. This says that the state of
the world is the same with respect to the properties that the agent reasons about (i.e., the
propositions in Φe).
REV1 π(r,m)(p) = π(r, 0)(p) for all p ∈ Φe and points (r,m).
Note that REV1 does not necessarily imply that re(m) = re(m+1). That is, REV1 allows
for a changing environment. The only restriction is that the truth value of propositions
that describe the environment does not change. We return to this issue in Section 7.
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The representation of (Grove, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) requires the agent
to totally order possible worlds. We put a similar requirement on the agent’s plausibility
assessment. Recall that BCS5 says that the agent’s plausibility is induced by a prior Pla;
REV2 strengthens this assumption.
REV2 The prior Pla of BCS5 is ranked; that is, for all A,B ⊆ R, either
Pla(A) ≤ Pla(B) or Pla(B) ≤ Pla(A), and Pl(A ∪B) = max(Pl(A),Pl(B)).
The representation of (Grove, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a) also requires that
the agent considers all truth assignments possible. We need a similar condition, except that
we want not only that all truth assignments be considered possible, but that they have
nontrivial plausibility (i.e., are more plausible than ⊥) as well.
To make this precise, it is helpful to introduce some notation that will be useful for our
later definitions as well. Given a system I and two sequences ϕ1, . . . , ϕk and o1, . . . , ok′
of formulas in Le, let R[ϕ1, . . . , ϕk; o1, . . . , ok′ ] consist of all runs r where for each i with
1 ≤ i ≤ k, the formula ϕi is true at (r, i) and the agent observes o1, . . . , ok′ . That is,
R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕk; o1, . . . , ok′ ] = {r ∈ I : (I, r, i) |= ϕi, i = 0, . . . , k, and ra(k
′) = 〈o1, . . . , ok′〉}.
We allow either sequence of formulas to be empty, so, for example, R[ϕ; ·] consists of all
runs for which ϕ is true at the initial state. (Note that if REV1 holds, this means that ϕ is
true in all subsequent states as well.) We use the notation R[ϕ1, . . . , ϕm] as an abbreviation
for R[ϕ1, . . . , ϕm; ·].
REV3 If ϕ ∈ Le is consistent, then Pla(R[ϕ]) > ⊥.
It might seem that REV1–REV3 capture all of the assumptions made by the representa-
tion of (Grove, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a). However, there is another assumption
implicit in the way revision is performed in these representations that we must make explicit
in our representation, because of the way we have distinguished observing ϕ (captured by
the formula learn(ϕ)) from ϕ itself. Intuitively, when the agent observes ϕ, she updates her
plausibility assessment by conditioning on ϕ. This is essentially what we can think of the
earlier representations as doing. However, in our representation, the agent does not condi-
tion on ϕ, but on the fact that she has observed ϕ. Although we do require that ϕ must
be true if the agent observes it (BCS4), the agent may in general gain extra information by
observing ϕ.
To understand this issue, consider the following example. Suppose that R is such that
the agent observes p1 at time (r,m) only if p2 and q are also true at (r,m), and she observes
p1 ∧ p2 at (r,m) only if q is false. It is easy to construct a BCS satisfying REV1–REV3
that also satisfies these requirements. In this system, after observing p1, the agent believes
p2 and q. According to AGM’s postulate R7 (and also KM’s postulate U5) the agent must
believe q after observing p1 ∧ p2. To see this, note that our assumptions about R can
be phrased in the AGM language as p2 ∧ q ∈ K ◦ p1 and ¬q ∈ K ◦ (p1 ∧ p2). Postulate
R7 states that K ◦ (p1 ∧ p2) ⊆ Cl(K ◦ p1 ∪ {p2}). Since p2 ∈ K ◦ p1, we have that
Cl(K ◦p1∪{p2}) = K ◦p1. Thus, R7 implies in this case that q ∈ K ◦(p1∧p2). However, in
R, the agent believes (indeed knows) ¬q after observing p1∧p2.
8 Thus, revision and update
8. We stress this does not mean that p1∧p2 implies ¬q in R. There may well be points in R at which p1∧p2∧q
is true. However, at such points, the agent would not observe p1 ∧ p2, since the agent observes p1 ∧ p2 only
if q is false.
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both are implicitly assuming that the observation of ϕ does not provide such additional
knowledge. The following assumption ensures that this is the case for revision (a more
general version will be required for update; see Section 6).
REV4 Pla(R[ϕ; o1, . . . , om]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ; o1, . . . , om]) if and only if Pla(R[ϕ ∧
o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ ∧ o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]).
This assumption captures the intuition that observing o1, . . . , ok provides no more in-
formation than just the fact that o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om is true. That is, the agent compares the
plausibility of ϕ and ψ in the same way after conditioning by the observations o1, . . . , om
as after conditioning by the fact that o1 ∧ . . .∧ om is true. It easily follows from REV4 and
PRIOR that the agent believes ψ after observing o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om exactly if o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om ∧ ψ
was initially considered more plausible than o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om ∧ ¬ψ. Thus, the agent believes ψ
after observing o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om exactly if initially, she believed ψ conditional on o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om:
the observations provide no extra information beyond the fact that each of the oi’s are true.
REV4 is quite a strong assumption. Not only does it say that observations do not
give the agent any additional information (beyond the fact that they are true), it also says
that all consistent observations can be made (since if ϕ ∧ o is consistent, we must have
Pla(R[ϕ; o]) = Pla(R[ϕ ∧ o]) > ⊥, by REV3 and REV4). We might instead consider using
a weaker version of REV4 that says that, provided an observation can be made, it gives no
additional information. Formally, this would be captured as
REV4′ If Pla(R[ϕ; o1, . . . , om]) > 0, then Pla(R[ϕ; o1, . . . , om]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ; o1, . . . , om])
if and only if Pla(R[ϕ ∧ o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ ∧ o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]).
The following examples suggests that REV4′ may be more reasonable in practice than
REV4. We used REV4 only because it comes closer to the spirit of the requirement of
revision that all observations are possible.
Example 5.1: Consider the system Idiag,1 described in Example 2.1. As discussed in Ex-
ample 4.1, this system can be viewed as a BCS. Is it a revision system? It is easy to see that
Idiag,1 satisfies REV2 and REV3. It clearly does not satisfy REV1, since propositions that
describe input/output lines can change their values from one point to the next. However,
as we are about to show, a slight variant of Idiag,1 does satisfy REV1. A more fundamental
problem is that Idiag,1 does not satisfy REV4. This is inherent in our assumption that the
agent never directly observes faults, so that, for example, we have Pldiag,1(R[·; f1]) = ⊥,
while Pldiag,1(R[f1]) > ⊥. It does, however, satisfy REV4
′.
To see how to modify Idiag,1 so as to satisfy REV1, recall that in the diagnosis task, the
agent is mainly interested in her beliefs about faults. Since faults are static in Idiag,1, we can
satisfy REV1 if we ignore all propositions except f1, . . . , fn. Let Φ
′
diag = {f1, . . . , fn} and let
L′diag be the propositional language over Φ
′
diag. For every observation o made by the agent
regarding the value of the lines, there corresponds a formula in L′diag that characterizes all
the fault sets that are consistent with o. Thus, for every run r in Idiag,1, we can construct
a run r′ where the agent’s local state is a sequence of formulas in L′diag. Let I
′
diag be the
system consisting of all such runs r′. We can clearly put a plausibility assignment on these
runs so that Idiag,1 and I
′
diag are isomorphic in an obvious sense. In particular, the agent
has the same beliefs about formulas in L′diag at corresponding points in the two systems.
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More precisely, if ϕ ∈ L′diag, then (I
′
diag, r,m) |= ϕ if and only if (Idiag,1, r,m) |= ϕ for all
points (r,m) in Idiag,1. It is easy to verify that I
′
diag satisfies REV1–REV3 and REV4
′,
although it still does not satisfy REV4.
We are not advocating here here using I ′diag instead of Idiag—Idiag seems to us a perfectly
reasonable way of modeling the situation. Rather, the point is that if we want a BCS to
satisfy properties that validate the AGM postulates, we must make some strong, and not
always natural, assumptions. ⊓⊔
We want to show that a revision operator corresponds to a system in CR and vice
versa. To do so, we need to examine the beliefs of the agent at each point (r,m). First
we note that if (r,m) ∼a (r
′,m′) then (I, r,m) |= Bϕ if and only if (I, r′,m′) |= Bϕ;
this is a consequence of the requirement that, as we have defined interpreted systems, the
agent’s plausibility assessment is a function of her local state. Thus, we think of the agent’s
beliefs as a function of her local state. We use the notation (I, sa) |= Bϕ as shorthand for
(I, r,m) |= Bϕ for some (r,m) such that ra(m) = sa. Let sa be some local state of the
agent. We define the agent’s belief state at sa as
Bel(I, sa) = {ϕ ∈ Le : (I, sa) |= Bϕ}.
Since the agent’s state is a sequence of observations, the agent’s state after observing ϕ is
simply sa · ϕ, where · is the append operation. Thus, Bel(I, sa · ϕ) is the belief state after
observing ϕ. We adopt the convention that if the agent can never attain the local state sa
in I, then Bel(I, sa) = Le. With these definitions, we can compare the agent’s belief state
before and after observing ϕ, that is Bel(I, sa) and Bel(I, sa · ϕ).
We start by showing that every AGM revision operator can be represented in CR.
Theorem 5.2: Let ◦ be an AGM revision operator and let K ⊆ Le be a consistent belief
state. Then there is a system I◦,K ∈ C
R such that Bel(I◦,K , 〈〉) = K and
Bel(I◦,K , 〈〉) ◦ ϕ = Bel(I◦,K , 〈ϕ〉)
for all ϕ ∈ Le.
Proof: See Appendix A.1. ⊓⊔
Thus, Theorem 5.2 says that we can represent a revision operator ◦ in the sense that we
have a family of systems I◦,K ∈ C
R, one for each consistent belief state K, such that K is
the agent’s initial belief state in I◦,K, and for each formula ϕ in Le, the agent’s belief state
after learning ϕ is K ◦ ϕ. Notice that we restrict attention to consistent belief states K.
The AGM postulates allow the agent to “escape” from an inconsistent state, so that K ◦ ϕ
may be consistent even if K is inconsistent. We might thus hope to extend the theorem so
that it also applies to the inconsistent belief state, but this is impossible in our framework.
If false ∈ Bel(I◦,K , sa) for some state sa, and ra(m) = sa, then Pl(r,m)(W(r,m)) = ⊥. Since
we update by conditioning, we must have Pl(r,m+1)(W(r,m+1)) = ⊥, so the agent’s belief
state will remain inconsistent no matter what she learns. Although we could modify our
framework to allow the agent to escape from inconsistent states, we actually consider this
to be a defect in the AGM postulates, not in our framework. To see why, suppose that the
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agent’s belief set is inconsistent at sa, and ra(m) = sa. Thus, the agent considers all states
in W(r,m) to be completely implausible (since Pl(r,m)(W(r,m)) = ⊥). On the other hand, to
escape inconsistency, she must have a plausibility ordering over the worlds inW(r,m). These
two requirements seem somewhat inconsistent.9
Not surprisingly, this inconsistency creates problems for other semantic representations
in the literature. For example, Boutilier’s representation theorem (1992) states that for
every revision operator ◦ and belief state K, there is a ranking R such that ψ ∈ K ◦ϕ if and
only if ψ is believed in the minimal ϕ-worlds according to R. If we examine this theorem, we
note that he does not state that the minimal (i.e., most preferred) worlds in R correspond
to the belief state K (in the sense that the minimal worlds are precisely those where the
formulas in K hold); this would be the analogue of our requiring that Bel(I◦,K , 〈〉) = K.
In fact, if K is ⊢Le-consistent, the minimal worlds do correspond to K. However, if K is
inconsistent, they cannot, since any nonempty ranking induces a consistent set of beliefs.
We could state a weaker version of Theorem 5.2 that would correspond exactly to Boutilier’s
theorem. We presented the stronger result (that does not apply to inconsistent belief states)
to bring out what we believe to be a problem with the AGM postulates. See (Friedman &
Halpern, 1998a) for further discussion of this issue.
Theorem 5.2 shows that, in a precise sense, we can map AGM revision operations to
CR. What about the other direction? The next theorem shows that the first belief change
step in systems in CR satisfies the AGM postulates.
Theorem 5.3: Let I be a system in CR. Then there is an AGM revision operator ◦I such
that
Bel(I, 〈〉) ◦I ϕ = Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉)
for all ϕ ∈ Le.
Proof: See Appendix A.1. ⊓⊔
We remark that if we used REV4′ instead of REV4, then we would be able to prove this
result only for those formulas ϕ that are observable (i.e., for which Pl(R[ϕ]) > ⊥).
Both Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 apply to one-step revision, starting from the initial (empty)
state. What happens once we allow iterated revision? In our framework, observations are
taken to be known, so if the agent makes an inconsistent sequence of observations, then her
belief state will be inconsistent, and (as we observed above) will remain inconsistent from
then on, no matter what she observes. This creates a problem if we try to get analogues to
Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 for iterated revision. As the following theorem demonstrates, we can
already see the problem if we consider one-step revisions from a state other than the initial
state.
Theorem 5.4: Let I be a system in CR and let sa = 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕk〉 be a local state in I.
Then there is an AGM revision operator ◦I,sa such that
Bel(I, sa) ◦I,sa ϕ = Bel(I, sa · ϕ)
9. One strength of the AGM framework is that it can deal with an inconsistent sequence of observations, that
is, it can cope with an observation sequence of the form 〈p,¬p, p,¬p, . . .〉. We stress that being able to
cope with such an inconsistent sequence of observations does not require allowing the agent to escape from
inconsistent belief sets. These are two orthogonal issues.
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for all formulas ϕ ∈ Le such that ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ϕ is consistent.
Proof: See Appendix A.1. ⊓⊔
We cannot do better than this. If ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk ∧ ϕ is inconsistent then, because of
our requirements that all observations must be true of the current state of the environment
(BCS4) and that propositions are static (REV1), there cannot be any global state in I
where the agent’s local state in sa ·ϕ. Thus, Bel(I, sa ·ϕ) is inconsistent, contradicting R5.
There is another problem with trying to get an analogue of Theorem 5.3 for iterated
revision, a problem that seems inherent in the AGM framework. Our framework makes a
clear distinction between the agent’s epistemic state at a point (r,m) in I, which we can
identify with her local state sa = ra(m), and the agent’s belief set at (r,m), Bel(I, sa),
which is the set of formulas she believes. In a system in CR, the agent’s belief set does
not in general determine how the agent’s beliefs will be revised; her epistemic state does.
On the other hand, the AGM postulates assume that revision is a function of the agent’s
belief set and observations. Now suppose we have a system I and two points (r,m) and
(r,m′) on some run r ∈ I such that (1) the agent’s belief set is the same at (r,m) and
(r,m′), that is Bel(I, ra(m)) = Bel(I, ra(m
′)), (2) the agent observes ϕ at both (r,m) and
(r,m′), (3) Bel(I, ra(m+1)) 6= Bel(I, ra(m
′+1). It is not hard to construct such a system
I. However, there cannot be an analogue of Theorem 5.3 for I, even if we restrict to
consistent sequences of observations. For suppose there were a revision operator ◦ such
Bel(I, 〈〉)) ◦ ϕ1 ◦ · · · ◦ ϕk = Bel(I, 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕk〉) for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕk such that ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk is
consistent. Then we would have Bel(I, ra(m+1)) = Bel(I, ra(m))◦ϕ = Bel(I, ra(m
′))◦ϕ =
Bel(I, ra(m
′ + 1)), contradicting our assumption.
The culprit here is the assumption that revision depends only on the agent’s belief set.
To see why this is an unreasonable assumption, consider a situation where at time 0 the
agent believes both p and q, but her belief in q is stronger than her belief in p (i.e., the
plausibility of q is greater than that of p). We can well imagine that after observing ¬p∨¬q
at time 1, she would believe ¬p and q. However, if she first observed p at time 1 and then
¬p∨¬q at time 2, she would believe p and ¬q, because, as a result of observing p, she would
assign p greater plausibility than q. Note, however, that the AGM postulates dictate that
after an observation that is already believed, the agent does not change her beliefs. Thus,
the AGM setup would force the agent to have the same beliefs after learning ¬p ∨ ¬q in
both situations.
There has been a great deal of work on the problem of iterated belief revision (Boutilier,
1996a; Darwiche & Pearl, 1997; Freund & Lehmann, 1994; Lehmann, 1995; Levi, 1988;
Nayak, 1994; Williams, 1994)). Much of the recent work moves away from the assumption
that belief revision depends solely on the agent’s belief set. For example the approaches
of Boutilier (1996a) and Darwiche and Pearl (1997) define revision operators that map
(rankings × formulas) to rankings. Because our framework makes such a clear distinction
between epistemic states and belief states, it gives us a natural way of maintaining the
spirit of the AGM postulates while assuming that revision is a function of epistemic states.
Rather than taking ◦ to be a function from (belief states × formulas) to belief states, we
take it ◦ to be a function from (epistemic states × formulas) to epistemic states.
This leaves open the question of how to represent epistemic states. Boutilier and Dar-
wiche and Pearl use rankings to represent epistemic states. In our framework, we represent
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epistemic states by local states in interpreted systems. That is, a pair (I, sa) denotes the
agent’s state in an interpreted system, and the pair determines the agent’s relevant epis-
temic attitudes, such as her beliefs, how her beliefs changed given particular observations,
her plausibility assessment over runs, and so on. When the system is understood, we simply
use sa as a shorthand representation of an epistemic state.
We can easily modify the AGM postulates to deal with such revision operators on
epistemic states. We start by assuming that there is a set of epistemic states and a function
Bel(·) that maps epistemic states to belief states. We then have analogues to each of the
AGM postulates, obtained by replacing each belief set by the beliefs in the corresponding
epistemic state. For example, we have
(R1′) E ◦ ϕ is an epistemic state
(R2′) ϕ ∈ Bel(E ◦ ϕ)
(R3′) Bel(E ◦ ϕ) ⊆ Cl(Bel(E) ∪ {ϕ})
and so on, with the obvious transformation.10
We can get strong representation theorems if we work at the level of epistemic states.
Given a language Le (with an associated consequence relation ⊢Le), let ELe consist of all
finite sequences of formulas in Le. Note that we allow ELe to include sequences of formulas
whose conjunction is inconsistent. We define revision in ELe in the obvious way: if E ∈ ELe ,
then E ◦ ϕ = E · ϕ.
Theorem 5.5: Let I be a system in CR whose local states are ELe. There is a function
BelI that maps epistemic states to belief states such that
• if sa is a local state of the agent in I, then Bel(I, sa) = BelI(sa), and
• (◦,BelI) satisfies R1
′–R8′.
Proof: Roughly speaking, we define BelI(sa) = Bel(I, sa) when sa is a local state in I. If
sa is not in I, then we set BelI(sa) = Bel(I, s
′), where s′ is the longest consistent suffix of
sa. See Appendix A.1 for details. ⊓⊔
Notice that, by definition, we have BelI(I, 〈〉 ◦I ϕ1 ◦I . . . ◦I ϕk) = BelI(I, 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕk〉),
so, at the level of epistemic states, we get an analogue to Theorem 5.3. We remark that to
ensure that R5′ holds for (◦,BelI), we need to define BelI(E) appropriately for sequences
E ∈ EI whose conjunction is inconsistent.
Theorem 5.5 shows that any system in CR corresponds to a revision operator over
epistemic states that satisfies the generalized AGM postulates. We would hope that the
converse also holds. Unfortunately, this is not quite the case. There are revision operators
on epistemic states that satisfy the generalized AGM postulates but do not correspond to
a system in CR. This is because systems in CR satisfy an additional postulate:
(R9′) If 6⊢Le ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) then Bel(E ◦ ϕ ◦ ψ) = Bel(E ◦ ϕ ∧ ψ).
10. The only problematic postulate is R6. The question is whether R6′ should be “If ⊢Le ϕ⇔ ψ then Bel(E◦ϕ) =
Bel(E ◦ ψ)” or “If ⊢Le ϕ ⇔ ψ then E ◦ ϕ = E ◦ ψ”. Dealing with either version is straightforward. For
definiteness, we adopt the first alternative here.
138
Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems. Part II.
We show that R9′ is sound in CR by proving the following strengthening of Theorem 5.5.
Proposition 5.6: Let I be a system in CR whose local states are ELe. There is a function
BelI that maps epistemic states to belief states such that
• if sa is a local state of the agent in I, then Bel(I, sa) = BelI(sa), and
• (◦,BelI) satisfies R1
′–R9′.
Proof: We show that the function BelI defined in the proof of Theorem 5.5 satisfies R9
′.
See Appendix A.1 for details. ⊓⊔
We can prove the converse to Proposition 5.6: a revision system on epistemic states that
satisfies the generalized AGM postulates and R9′ does correspond to a system in CR.
Theorem 5.7: Given a function BelLe mapping epistemic states in ELe to belief sets over
Le such that BelLe(〈〉) is consistent and (BelLe , ◦) satisfies R1
′–R9′, there is a system I ∈ CR
whose local states are in ELe such that BelLe(sa) = Bel(sa) for each local state sain I.
Proof: According to Theorem 5.2, there is a system I such that Bel(I, 〈〉) = BelLe(〈〉)
and Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉) = BelLe(〈ϕ〉) for all ϕ ∈ Le. We show that Bel(I, sa) = BelLe(sa) for local
states sa in I. See Appendix A.1. ⊓⊔
Notice that, by definition, for the system I of Theorem 5.7, we have Bel(〈〉◦ϕ1◦. . .◦ϕk) =
Bel(〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕk〉) as long as ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕk is consistent.
6. Capturing Update
Update tries to capture the intuition that there is a preference for runs where all the
observations made are true, and where changes from one point to the next along the run
are minimized.
We start by reviewing Katsuno and Mendelzon’s semantic representation of update. To
characterize an agent beliefs, Katsuno and Mendelzon consider the set of “worlds” the agent
considers possible. In their representation, they associate a world with a truth assignment to
the primitive propositions. (In our terminology, we can think of a world as an environment
state.) To capture the notion of “minimal change from world to world”, Katsuno and
Mendelzon use a distance function d on worlds. Given two worlds w and w′, d(w,w′)
measures the distance between them. Intuitively, the larger the distance, the larger the
change required to get from world w to w′. (Note that that distances are not necessarily
symmetric, that is, it might require a smaller change to get from w to w′, than from w′
to w.) Distances might be incomparable, so we require that d map pairs of worlds into a
partially ordered domain with a unique minimal element 0 and that d(w,w′) = 0 if and only
if w = w′.
Katsuno and Mendelzon show that there is a close relationship between update operators
and distance functions. To make this relationship precise, we need to introduce some
definitions. An update structure is a tuple U = (W,d, π), where W is a finite set of worlds,
d is a distance function on W , and π is a mapping from worlds to truth assignments for Le
such that
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• π(w) is ⊢Le consistent,
• if 6⊢Le ¬ϕ, then there is some w ∈W with π(w)(ϕ) = true, and
• if w 6= w′ then π(w) 6= π(w′) for all w,w′ ∈W .
Given an update structure U = (W,d, π), we define [[ϕ]]U = {w : π(w)(ϕ) = true}. Kat-
suno and Mendelzon use update structures as semantic representations of update operators.
Given an update structure U = (W,d, π) and sets A,B ⊆ W , Katsuno and Mendelzon de-
fine minU (A,B) to be the set of worlds in B that are closest to worlds in A, according to
d. Formally, minU (A,B) = {w ∈ B : ∃w0 ∈ A∀w
′ ∈ B d(w0, w
′) 6< d(w0, w)}.
Theorem 6.1: (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b) A belief change operator ⋄ satisfies U1–U8
if and only if there is an update structure U = (W,π, d) such that
[[ϕ ⋄ ψ]]U = minU ([[ϕ]]U , [[ψ]]U ).
Thus the worlds the agent believes possible after updating with ψ are these worlds that are
closest to some world considered possible before learning ψ.
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s account of update is “static” in the sense that it describes a
single belief change. Nevertheless, there is a clear intuition that each world w′ ∈ [[ϕ ⋄ ψ]]U
is the result of considering a minimal change from some world w ∈ [[ϕ]]U . However, in
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s representation, we do not keep track of the worlds that “lead to”
the worlds in the current belief set.
We now try to capture behavior similar to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s semantics in our
framework. We define systems where each run describes the sequence of changes, so that the
most plausible runs, given a set of observations, correspond the worlds that define the belief
set in Katsuno and Mendelzon’s semantics. More precisely, given a sequence of observations
ψ1, . . . , ψn, each world in [[ϕ⋄ψ1⋄. . .⋄ψn]]U can be “traced” back through a series of minimal
changes to a world in [[ϕ]]U . In our model, each such trace corresponds to one of the most
plausible runs, where the environment state at time m is the mth world in the trace. We
can capture this intuition by using a family of priors with a particular form.
We start with some preliminary definitions. Let I be a BCS, and let s0, . . . , sn be a
set of environment states in I. We define [s0, . . . , sn] as the set of runs where re(i) = si
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, [s0, . . . , sn] describes a set of runs that share a common prefix of
environment states. A prior plausibility space Pa = (R,Pla) is consistent with a distance
measure d if the following holds:
Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) < Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]) if and only if there is some j < n such that
sk = s
′
k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ j, sj+1 6= s
′
j+1, and d(sj , sj+1) < d(sj , s
′
j+1).
Intuitively, we compare events of the form [s0, . . . , sn] using a lexicographic ordering based
on d. Notice that this ordering focuses on the first point of difference. Runs with a smaller
change at this point are preferred, even if later there are abnormal changes. This point is
emphasized in the borrowed car example below.
Pla is prefix-defined if the plausibility of an event is uniquely defined by the plausibility
of run-prefixes that are contained in it, so that
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Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕm]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψm]) if and only if for all [s0, . . . , sm] ⊆
R[ψ0, . . . , ψm] −R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕm] there is some [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m] ⊆ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕm] such
that Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m]) > Pla([s0, . . . , sm]).
Roughly speaking, this requirement states that we compare events by properties of dom-
inance. This property is similar to one satisfied by the plausibility measures that we get
from preference ordering using the construction of Proposition 2.2.
We define the set CU to consist of BCSs I = (R, π,P) that satisfy the following four
requirements UPD1–UPD4. UPD1 says that there are only finitely many possible truth
assignments, and that there is a one-to-one map between environment states and truth
assignments.
UPD1 The set Φe of propositions (of BCS1) is finite and π is such that for
all environment states s, s′, if s 6= s′, then there is a formula ϕ ∈ Le such that
s |= ϕ and s′ |= ¬ϕ.
UPD2–UPD4 are analogues to REV2–REV4. Like REV2, UPD2 puts constraints on
the form of the prior, but now we consider lexicographic priors of the form described above.
UPD2 The prior of BCS5 is prefix defined and consistent with some distance
measure.
Recall that REV3 requires only that all truth assignments initially have nontrivial plau-
sibility. In the case of revision, the truth assignment does not change over time, since
we are dealing with static propositions. In the case of update, the truth assignment may
change over time, so UPD3 requires that all consistent sequences of truth assignments have
nontrivial plausibility.
UPD3 If ϕi ∈ Le, i = 0, . . . , k, are consistent formulas, then Pl(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕk]) >
⊥.
Finally, like REV4, UPD4 requires that the agent gain no information from her obser-
vations beyond the fact that they are true.
UPD4 Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕk+1; o1, . . . , ok]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψm+1; o1, . . . , om]) if
and only if Pla(R[ϕ0, ϕ1∧o1, . . . , ϕm∧om, ϕm+1]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, ψ1∧o1, . . . , ψm∧
om, ψm+1])
We remark that in the presence of REV1, UPD4 is equivalent to REV4. We might consider
generalized versions of UPD4, where the two sequences of formulas can have arbitrary
relative lengths; this version suffices for our purposes. We can also define an analogue
UPD4′ in the spirit of REV4′, which applies only if Pl(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕm+1; o1, . . . , om]) > ⊥.
We now show that CU corresponds to (KM) update. Recall that Katsuno and Mendelzon
define an update operator as mapping a pair of formulas (µ,ϕ), where µ describes the agent’s
beliefs and ϕ describes the observation, to a new formula µ ⋄ ϕ that describes the agent’s
new beliefs. However, as we discussed in Section 3, when Φe is finite, we can also treat ⋄
mapping a belief state and a formula to a new belief state. Also recall that Bel(I, sa) is the
agent’s belief set when her local state is sa.
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Theorem 6.2: A belief change operator ⋄ satisfies U1–U8 if and only if there is a system
I ∈ CU such that
Bel(I, sa) ⋄ ψ = Bel(I, sa · ψ)
for all epistemic states sa and formulas ψ ∈ Le.
Proof: Roughly speaking, we show that any system in CU corresponds to a Katsuno and
Mendelzon update structure. Suppose that I =∈ CU is such that the set of environment
states is Se and the prior of BCS5 is consistent with distance function d. We define an
update structure UI . We then show that belief change in I corresponds to belief change in
UI in the sense of Theorem 6.1. Since Theorem 6.1 states that any belief change operation
defined by an update structure satisfies U1–U8, this will suffice to prove the “if” direction
of the theorem. To prove the “only if” direction of the theorem, we show that that for any
update structure U , there is a system I ∈ CU such that UI = U .
See Appendix A.2 for details. ⊓⊔
This result immediately generalizes to sequences of updates.
Corollary 6.3: A belief change operator ⋄ satisfies U1–U8 if and only if there is a system
I⋄ ∈ C
U such that for all ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ Le, we have
Bel(I⋄, sa) ⋄ ψ1 ⋄ . . . ⋄ ψk = Bel(I⋄, sa · ψ1 · . . . · ψk).
These results show that for update, unlike revision, the systems we consider are such that
the belief state does determine the result of the update, i.e., if Bel(I, sa) = Bel(I, s
′
a), then
for any ϕ we get that Bel(I, sa ·ϕ) = Bel(I, s
′
a ·ϕ). Roughly speaking, the reason is that the
distance measure that determines the prior does not change over time. While this allows
us to get an elegant representation theorem, it also causes problems for the applicability of
update, as we shall see below.
Note that, since the world is allowed to change, there is no problem if we update by a
sequence ψ1, . . . , ψk of consistent formulas such that ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk is inconsistent. There
is no requirement that the formulas ψ1, . . . , ψk be true simultaneously. All that matters is
that ψi is true at time i. Also note that an update by an inconsistent formula does not pose
a problem for our framework. It follows from postulates U1 and U2 that once the agent
learns an inconsistent formula (i.e., false), she believes false from then on.
How reasonable is the notion of update? As the discussion of UPD2 above suggests, it
has a preference for deferring abnormal events. This makes it quite similar to Shoham’s
chronological ignorance (1988), and it suffers from some of the same problems. Consider
the following story, that we call the borrowed-car example.11 At time 1, the agent parks her
car in front of her house with a full fuel tank. At time 2, she is in her house. At time 3,
she returns outside to find the car still parked where she left it. Since the agent does not
observe the car while she is inside the house, there is no reason for her to revise her beliefs
regarding the car’s location. Since she finds it parked at time 3, she still has no reason
to change her beliefs. Now, what should the agent believe when, at time 4, she notices
that the fuel tank is no longer full? The agent may want to consider a number of possible
11. This example is based on Kautz’s stolen car story (1986), and is due to Boutilier, who independently observed
this problem [private communication, 1993].
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explanations for her time-4 observation, depending on what she considers to be the most
likely sequence(s) of events between time 1 and time 4. For example, if she has had previous
gas leaks, then she may consider leakage to be the most plausible explanation. On the other
hand, if her spouse also has the car keys, she may consider it possible that he used the car
in her absence. Update, however, prefers to defer abnormalities, so it will conclude that the
fuel must have disappeared, for inexplicable reasons, between times 3 and 4. To see this,
note that runs where the car has been taken on a ride have an abnormality at time 2, while
runs where the car did not move at time 2 but the fuel suddenly disappeared, have their
first abnormality at time 4, and thus are preferred!
Suppose we formalize the example using propositions such as car-parked-outside, fuel-
tank-full, etc. Let the agent’s belief set at time i be µi, i = 1, . . . , 4. Notice that µ1 includes
the belief that the car is parked in front of the house with a full fuel tank. (That is,
⊢Le µ1 ⇒ fuel-tank-full ∧ car-parked-outside.) At time 2 the agent makes no observations
since she is in her house, so µ2 = µ1 ⋄ true = µ1 by U2. At time 3 the agent observes
the car outside her house, so µ3 = µ2 ⋄ car-parked-outside = µ1, again by U2. Finally,
µ4 = µ3 ⋄ ¬fuel-tank-full. The observation of ¬fuel-tank-full at time 4 must be explained
by some means. In our semantics, the answer is clear. The most plausible runs are these
where the car was parked until time 3, and somewhere between time 3 and 4 some change
occurred.
Is this counterintuitive conclusion an artifact of our representation? To some extent
it is. This issue cannot be formally addressed within Katsuno and Mendelzon’s semantic
framework, since that framework does not provide an account of sequences of changes.
Moreover, one might argue that within out framework there might be other families of priors
that satisfy U1–U8, which will offer alternative explanations of the surprising observation
at time 4. Nevertheless, we claim that our semantics captures, in what we believe to
be the most straightforward way, the intuition embedded in the Katsuno and Mendelzon’s
representation. In particular, condition UPD2, which enforces the delay of abnormal events,
was needed in order to capture the “pointwise” nature of the update. It would be interesting
to know whether there is a natural way of capturing update in our framework that does not
suffer from these problems.
Does this way of capturing update semantically ever lead to reasonable results? Of
course, that depends on how we interpret “reasonable”. We briefly consider one approach
here.
In a world w, the agent has some beliefs that are described by, say, the formula ϕ. These
beliefs may or may not be correct (where we say a belief ϕ is correct in a world w if ϕ is true
of w). Suppose something happens and the world changes to w′. As a result of the agent’s
observations, she has some new beliefs, described by ϕ′. Again, there is no reason to believe
that ϕ′ is correct. Indeed, it may be quite unreasonable to expect ϕ′ to be correct, even if
ϕ is correct. Consider the borrowed-car example. Suppose that while the agent was sitting
inside the house, the car was, in fact, taken for a ride. Nevertheless, the most reasonable
belief for the agent to hold when she observes that the car is still in the parked after she
leaves the house is that it was there all along.
The problem here is that the information the agent obtains at times 2 and 3 is insufficient
to determine what happened. We cannot expect all the agent’s beliefs to be correct at this
point. On the other hand, if she does obtain sufficient information about the change and
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her beliefs were initially correct, then it seems reasonable to expect that her new beliefs will
be correct. But what counts as sufficient information?
We say that ϕ provides sufficient information about the change from w to w′ if there
is no world w′′ satisfying ϕ such that d(w,w′′) < d(w,w′). In other words, ϕ is sufficient
information if, after observing ϕ in world w, the agent will consider the real world (w′) one
of the most likely worlds. Note that this definition is monotonic, in that if ϕ is sufficient
information about the change, then so is any formula ψ that implies ϕ (as long as it holds at
w′). Moreover, this definition depends on the agent’s distance function d. What constitutes
sufficient information for one agent might not for another. We would hope that the function
d is realistic in the sense that the worlds judged closest according to d really are the most
likely to occur.
We can now show that update has the property that if the agent has correct beliefs and
receives sufficient information about a change, then she will continue to have correct beliefs.
Theorem 6.4: Let I ∈ CU . If the agent’s beliefs at (r,m) are correct and o(r,m) provides
sufficient information about the change from re(m) to re(m+1), then the agent’s beliefs at
(r,m+ 1) are correct.
Proof: Straightforward; left to the reader. ⊓⊔
As we observed earlier, we cannot expect the agent to always have correct beliefs. Nev-
ertheless, we might hope that if the agent does (eventually) receive sufficiently detailed
information, then she should realize that her beliefs were incorrect. But this is precisely
what does not happen in the borrowed-car example. Intuitively, once the agent observes
that the fuel tank is not full, this should be sufficient information to eliminate the possi-
bility that the car remained in the parking lot. However, it is not. Roughly speaking, this
is because update focuses only on the current state of the world, and thus cannot go back
and revise beliefs about the past.
The problem here is again due to the fact that belief update is determined only by the
agent’s belief state and not her epistemic state. Thus, update can only take into account
the agent’s current beliefs and not other information, such as the sequence of observations
that led to these beliefs. In our example, if we limit our attention to beliefs about the car’s
whereabouts and the fuel tank, then since the agent has the same belief state at time 1
and 3, she must change her beliefs in the same manner at both times. This implies that the
observation the fuel tank is not full at time 4 cannot be sufficient information about the
past, since a fuel leak might be the most plausible explanation of missing fuel at time 2.12
Our discussion of update shows that update is guaranteed to be safe only in situations
where there is always enough information to characterize the change that has occurred.
While this may be a plausible assumption in database applications, it seems somewhat less
reasonable in AI examples, particularly in cases involving reasoning about action.13
12. In this example the usual intuition is that, given the observation that the tank is not full, the agent should
revise her belief in some manner instead of performing update. This immediately raises the question of how
the agent knows what the right belief change operation should be here. We return to this issue below.
13. Similar observations were independently made by Boutilier (1996b), although his representation is quite
different from ours.
144
Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems. Part II.
Restriction on Revision Update
Environment changes
No change
(Static propositions)
All possible sequences
Initial plausibility Total preorder Lexicographic
Belief change Conditioning Conditioning
Table 1: A summary of the restrictions we impose to capture revision and update.
7. Synthesis
In previous sections we analyzed belief revision and belief update separately. We provided
representation theorems for both notions and discussed issues specific to each notion. In
this section, we try to identify some common themes and points of difference.
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991a) focused on the following three differences between AGM
revision and KM update:
1. Revision deals with static propositions, while update allows propositions that are not
static.
2. Revision and update treat inconsistent belief states differently. Revision allows an
agent to “recover” from an inconsistent state after observing a consistent formula.
Update dictates that once the agent has inconsistent beliefs, she will continue to have
inconsistent beliefs. As we noted above, it seems that revision’s ability to recover from
an inconsistent belief set leads to several technical anomalies in iterated revision.
3. Revision considers only total preorders, while update allows partial preorders.
Our framework suggests a different approach to categorizing the differences between
revision and update (and other approaches to belief change): focusing on the restrictions
that have to be added to basic BCSs to obtain systems in CR and CU , respectively. In
particular, we focus on three aspects of a system:
• How does the environment state change?
• How does the agent form her initial beliefs? What regularities appear in the agent’s
beliefs at the initial state?
• How does the agent change her beliefs?
Table 1 summarizes the answers to these questions for revision and update; it highlights
the different restrictions imposed by each. Revision puts a severe restriction on changes
of the environment (more precisely, on how we describe the environment in the language)
and a rather mild restriction on the agent’s prior beliefs (they must form a total preorder).
On the other hand, update allows all sequences of environment states, but requires the
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agent’s prior beliefs to have a specific form. These formal properties match the intuitive
description of revision and update given in (Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Katsuno & Mendelzon,
1991b). However, the explicit representation of time in our framework allows us to make
these intuitions precise. Moreover, our framework makes explicit other assumptions made
by revision and update. For example, the lexicographic nature of update is not immediately
evident from the presentation in (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b).
The key point to notice in this table is that belief change in both revision and update
is done by conditioning. This observation, and the naturalness of conditioning as a notion
of change, support our claim that conditioning should be adopted as semantic foundations
for minimal change.
How significant are the differences between revision and update? We claim that some
of these differences are a result of different ways of modeling the same underlying process.
Recall that in the introduction we noted that the restriction to static propositions is not such
a serious limitation of belief revision, since we can always convert a dynamic proposition
to a static one by adding timestamps. More precisely, we can replace a proposition p by a
family of propositions pm that stand for “p is true at time m”. This makes it possible to
use revision to reason about a changing world. We now show how revision and update can
be related under this viewpoint.
To make this discussion precise, we need to introduce some formal definitions. Let
I = (R, π,P) be a BCS. We “statify” I into a system I∗ = (R∗, π∗,P∗) by replacing the
underlying language with static propositions.
Let Φ∗e = {p
m : p ∈ Φe,m ∈ N} be a set of timestamped propositions and let L
∗
e be the
logical language based on these propositions. We can easily “timestamp” every formula in L.
We define timestamp(ϕ,m) recursively as follows. The base case is timestamp(p,m) = pm
for p ∈ Φe. For standard logical connectives, we simply apply the transformation recursively,
for example timestamp(ϕ ∧ ψ) = timestamp(ϕ,m) ∧ timestamp(ψ,m).
Next, we define the set of runs in the “statified” system. For each run r ∈ R, we
define a r∗ in R∗ as follows. The environment states in r∗ are defined to be the whole
sequence of environment states in r, that is, r∗e(m) = re. If ra(m) = 〈o(r,1), . . . , o(r,m)〉, we
define ra(m) = 〈timestamp(o(r,1), 1), . . . , timestamp(o(r,m),m)〉. We define the interpreta-
tion π∗ in the obvious way: π∗(r∗,m)(pm
′
) = true if and only if π(r,m′)(p) = true and
π∗(r∗,m)(learn(ϕ)) = true if and only if o(r∗,m) = ϕ.
Finally, we need to define the prior plausibility Pl∗a. We define this prior to be isomorphic
to Pla under the transformation r
∗ 7→ r. That is, for each set of runs R∗ ⊆ R∗, we define
Pl∗a(R
∗) = Pla({r ∈ R : r
∗ ∈ R∗}).
It is clear that the two systems I and I∗ describe the same underlying process. Perhaps
the most significant difference is that the environment state in a run of I∗ encodes the
future of the run. This was necessary so that the environment state could determine the
truth of all propositions of the form pm, so as to satisfy BCS1. Without this requirement,
we could have simply changed π and left R and P unchanged.
Because different base languages are used in I and I∗, the agent has different beliefs
in the two systems. It is easy to show that, for all ϕ ∈ Le, we have (I, r,m) |= Bϕ iff
(I∗, r∗,m) |= B(timestamp(ϕ,m)). However, at (r∗,m) the agent also has beliefs about
propositions that describe past and future times. Thus, the set of beliefs of the agent in I∗
can be viewed as a superset of her beliefs in I at the corresponding points.
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The following result makes precise the relationship between I and I∗ in terms of the
properties we have been considering.
Proposition 7.1: Let I be a BCS and let I∗ the transformed system defined above. Then
• I∗ is a BCS, that is, it satisfies BCS1–BCS5.
• I∗ satisfies REV1.
• If I satisfies UPD3, then I∗ satisfies REV3.
• If I satisfies UPD4, then I∗ satisfies REV4′.
Proof: Straightforward; left to the reader. ⊓⊔
Thus, if I is a BCS, so is I∗. Moreover, if I ∈ CU , then I∗ satisfies all but two of the
requirements for CR. First, I∗ does not necessarily satisfy REV2, since the prior of systems
in CU is, in general, not ranked. Second, I∗ satisfies REV4′, the weaker version of REV4.
The reason for this is that runs I∗ do not allow all sequences of possible observations.
Remember that in the language of L∗e, the agent can observe the proposition p
2 (i.e., that
p is true at time 2) at time 1. However, in the original system, the agent only observes
properties of the current time. Thus, o(r∗,m) involves only propositions that deal with time
m.
Neither of these shortcomings is serious. First, variants of AGM revision that involve
partial orders were discussed in the literature (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991b; Rott, 1992).
It is fairly straightforward to show that these can captured in our systems using BCSs that
satisfy REV1, REV3, and REV4. Second, it is easy to add to I∗ runs so as to get a system
that satisfies REV4. Moreover, we can do this is a way that does not change the agent’s
beliefs for sequences of observations that can be observed in I. Thus, the “statified” version
of a system in CU displays behavior much in the spirit of belief revision.
This result may seem somewhat surprising in light of the significant differences between
the AGM postulates and KM postulates. In part, it shows how much is bound up in our
choice of language. (Recall that similar issues arose in Example 5.1.) This highlights the
sensitivity of the postulate approach to the modeling assumptions we make. Unfortunately,
these modeling assumptions are rarely discussed in the belief change literature. (See (Fried-
man & Halpern, 1998a) for a more detailed discussion of this point.)
Table 1 emphasizes that, despite the well-known differences between revision and update,
they can be viewed as sharing one very important feature: they both use conditioning to do
belief change. Thus, we have a common mechanism both for understanding and extending
them. To a certain extent, our results show that revision is more general than update, in
the sense that we can view the statified version of any system in CU as performing revision
(possibly with unranked prior) over runs.
8. Extensions
In the preceding sections, we introduced several assumptions that were needed to capture
revision and update. Of course, there are other ways of capturing these notions that require
somewhat different assumptions. Nevertheless, these assumptions give insight into the un-
derlying choices made, either explicitly or implicitly, in the definition of revision and update.
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In addition, thinking in terms of such restrictions makes it straightforward to extend the
intuitions of revision and update beyond the context where they were originally applied. In
this section, we consider a number of such extensions, to illustrate our point.
8.1 Knowledge
In many domains of interest, the agent knows that some sequences of observations are
impossible. We already saw in the circuit-diagnosis problem that observing failures was
impossible. In the context of update, we know that we cannot observe a person die and
then be alive, despite the fact that both being dead and being alive are consistent states.
We can easily maintain what we regard as the defining properties of revision and update,
as discussed in the previous section: no change in the environment state and a ranked prior
in the case of revision, and a lexicographic prior in the case of update, with belief change
proceeding by conditioning in both cases. We simply drop REV3 and replace REV4 by
REV4′ (resp., drop UPD3 and replace UPD4 and UPD4′). We remark that this change
affects the postulates. For example, consider update. Suppose that the agent considers
the possibility that Mr. Bond is dead. If she then observes Mr. Bond alive and well then,
according to update, she must account for the new observation by some change from the
worlds she previously considered possible. However, there is no transition from worlds
in which Mr. Bond is dead that can account for the new observation. Thus, once the
agent knows that certain transitions are impossible, some observations (e.g., observing that
Mr. Bond is alive) require her to remove from consideration some of the worlds that she
previously considered possible. As a consequence, postulate U8 does not hold, since the
agent’s new beliefs are not determined by a pointwise update at each of the worlds she
previously considered possible. (Boutilier (1998) uses a related semantic framework to
draw similar conclusions in his analysis of update.)
8.2 Language of Beliefs
In our analysis of revision and update, we focused on the agent’s beliefs about the current
state of the environment. Often we are also interested in how the agent changes her beliefs
about other types of statements, such as beliefs about future states of the environment,
beliefs about other agents’ beliefs, and introspective beliefs about her own beliefs. Again,
it is straightforward in our framework to deal with an enriched language that lets us ex-
press such statements. For example, in (Friedman & Halpern, 1994) we examine Ramsey
conditionals. These are formulas of the form ϕ > ψ, which can be read as saying “after
learning ϕ, the agent believes ψ”. This formula can be expressed as learn(ϕ)⇒ Bψ in the
language LKPT. As is well known, if belief sets include Ramsey conditionals (and not just
propositional formulas), then the AGM postulates become inconsistent (at least, provided
we have at least three mutually exclusive consistent formulas in the language) (Ga¨rdenfors,
1986). Similar inconsistency results arise when one tries to add other forms of introspective
beliefs (Fuhrmann, 1989). In our setting, it is easy to see why the problem arises. Even
if we allow belief sets to include nonpropositional formulas, it still seems quite clear that
we want to distinguish the propositional formulas from formulas that talk explicitly about
an agent’s beliefs. For example, it is not clear that we should allow an observation of a
formula such as ϕ > ψ. What would it mean to observe such a formula? It clearly seems
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quite different from observing a propositional formula. Nor does it make sense to extend an
assumption such as REV1 to arbitrary formulas. While it may be reasonable to restrict to
static propositions if we are viewing these as making statements about a relatively stable
environment, it seems far less reasonable to assume that formulas that talk about an agent’s
beliefs will be static, especially when we are trying to model belief change!
Of course, if we allow only propositional formulas to be learned (or observed), and
restrict REV1 to propositional formulas, then it is easy to see that all of our results still
hold, even if the full language is quite rich; we avoid the triviality result completely.
8.3 Observations
One of the strongest assumptions made by revision and update involves the treatment of
observations. This assumption seems unreasonable in most domains. REV4 and UPD4
essentially assume that the observation that the agent makes is chosen randomly among
all formulas consistent with the current state of the world. Suppose that ϕ says that the
agent is outdoors, ψ says that the agent is in the basement, and o1 says that the basement
light is on. We may well have Pla(R[ϕ ∧ o1]) > Pla(R[ψ ∧ o1]). For example, the agent
may hardly ever go to the basement and frequently go outdoors, but her children may often
leave the basement light on. Nevertheless, we may also have Pla(R[ϕ; o1]) < Pla(R[ψ; o1]),
contradicting REV4. Indeed, it may well be impossible for the agent to observe that the
basement light is on when she is outdoors, so that Pla(R[ϕ; o1]) = ⊥, but this is not
permitted according to REV4 or UPD4.
In many domains it is useful to reason about hidden quantities that simply cannot be
observed. For example, the event that component ci is faulty in Example 5.1 is a basic
event in our description of the problem, yet it cannot be observed. Similarly, the event
where a patient has a disease X or the opponent is planning to capture the queen are useful
in reasoning about medical diagnosis and game strategy, yet are not directly observable in
practice. Thus, the requirement that all formulas in the language can be observed seems
quite unnatural. We note that explicitly modeling sensory input is a standard practice in
control theory and stochastic processes (e.g., in hidden Markov chains). In these fields,
one models the probability of an observation in various situations. Making an observation
increases the probability of situations where that observation is likely to be observation and
decreases the probability of situations where it is unlikely. Again, it is straightforward to
consider a more detailed model of the observation process in our framework; see (Friedman,
1997, Chapter 6) and (Boutilier et al., 1998).
8.4 Actions
Our definition of belief change systems essentially assumes that the agent is passive. The
situation is more complex when the agent can influence the environment. The agent’s choice
of action interacts with her beliefs. It is clear that after performing an action, the agent
should change her beliefs.14 Moreover, the information content of observations depends on
the action the agent has just performed. For example, the agent might consider hearing a
14. Indeed, an alternative interpretation of the update postulates is that they describe how the agent should
update her beliefs after doing the action “achieve ϕ” (Goldszmidt & Pearl, 1996; del Val & Shoham, 1992,
1993). However, as these works show, the update postulates are problematic under this interpretation.
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loud noise to be surprising. However, it would be expected after the agent pulls the trigger
of her gun.
8.5 Summary
This list of possible extensions is clearly not exhaustive; there are many others that we
may want to consider. Nevertheless, these are extensions that seem to be of interest. The
main points we want to make here are (1) it is easy to accommodate these extensions in
our framework while still maintaining the main characteristics of revision and update, and
(2) it is difficult to deal with such extensions if we focus on postulates.
9. Conclusion
We have shown how the framework introduced in (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) can be used
to capture belief revision and update. Modeling revision and update in the framework also
gives us a great deal of further insight into their properties, and emphasizes the role of
conditioning as a way of capturing minimal change.
Of course, revision and update are but two points in a wide spectrum of possible types of
belief change. Our ultimate goal is to use this framework to understand the whole spectrum
better and to help us design belief change operations that overcome some of the difficulties
we have observed with revision and update. In particular, we want belief change operations
that can handle dynamic propositions, while still being able to revise information about the
past.
Our framework suggests how to construct such belief change operations. In this frame-
work, belief change operations can be determined by choosing a plausibility measure that
captures the agent’s preferences among sequences of worlds. This is the agent’s prior plau-
sibility, and captures her initial beliefs about the relative likelihood of runs. As the agent
receives information, she changes her beliefs using conditioning. In this paper we show that
revision and update correspond to two specific families of priors. Clearly, however, there
are prior plausibilities that, when conditioned on a surprising observation, allow the agent
to revise some earlier beliefs and to assume that some change has occurred. One obvious
problem is that, even if there are only two possible states, there are uncountably many
possible runs. How can an agent describe a prior plausibility over such a complex space?
One approach to doing this is based on intuition from the probabilistic settings. In
these settings, the standard solution to this problem is to assume that state transitions are
independent of when they occur, that is, that the probability of the system going from state
s to state s′ is independent of the sequence of transitions that brought the system to state
s. This Markov assumption significantly reduces the complexity of the problem. All that
is necessary is to describe the probability of state transitions. In (Friedman & Halpern,
1996; Friedman, 1997) we define a notion of plausibilistic independence, and show how to
describe priors that satisfy the Markov assumption and the consequences for belief change.
See also (Boutilier, 1998; Boutilier et al., 1998) for recent proposals along these lines.
Whether or not this particular approach turns out to be a useful one, it is clear that
these are the types of questions we should be asking. As these works show, our framework
provides a useful basis for answering them.
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Finally, we note that our approach is quite different from the traditional approach to
belief change (Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Ga¨rdenfors, 1988; Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1991a).
Traditionally, belief change was viewed as an abstract process. Our framework, on the other
hand, models the agent and the environment she is situated in, and how both change in time.
This allows us to model concrete agents in concrete settings (for example, diagnostic systems
are analyzed in (Friedman & Halpern, 1997) and throughout this paper), and to reason
about the beliefs and knowledge of such agents. We can then investigate what plausibility
ordering induces beliefs that match our intuitions. By gaining a better understanding of
such concrete situations, we can better investigate more abstract notions of belief change.
More generally, we believe that, when studying belief change, it is important to specify the
underlying ontology: that is, exactly what scenario underlies the belief-change process. We
have specified one such scenario here. While others are certainly possible, we view it as a
defect in the literature on belief change that the underlying scenario is so rarely discussed.
The framework we have introduced here provides a way of making formal what the scenario
is. (See (Friedman & Halpern, 1998a) for further discussion of this issue.)
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 5
We start with the proof of Theorems 5.2 and 5.3. To do this, we need some preliminary
definitions and lemmas. Figure 1 shows the general outline of the intermediate represen-
tations we use in these proofs. Roughly speaking, we show how to map from a revision
operator ◦ and a consistent belief set K to a ranking, and similarly how to map from a
ranking to an AGM revision operator. These rankings correspond, in a direct way, to priors
in systems in CR, and thus have close connection to the beliefs of the agent in various states.
These mapping between AGM revision operators and rankings are related to the repre-
sentation theorems of Boutilier (1994b), Grove (1988), and Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991a).
However, the exact details of our representations are different than those of Boutilier, Grove,
and Katsuno and Mendelzon. Thus, for completeness we provide the full proofs here.
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Figure 1: Schematic description of the entities and lemmas involved in the proof of Theo-
rems 5.2 and 5.3.
We start with the mapping from revision operator applied to a specific belief set to a
ranking. As an intermediate step we construct a set of defaults as follows. We then will use
the results from (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b) to construct a ranked plausibility structure
that satisfies these defaults.
Lemma A.1: Let ◦ be an AGM revision operator, let K ⊆ Le be a consistent belief set,
and let
∆(◦,K) = {ϕ→ψ : ϕ,ψ ∈ Le, ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ}.
Then the following is true:
(a) ∆(◦,K) is closed under the rules of system P,
(b) ϕ→false 6∈ ∆(◦,K) for all consistent ϕ ∈ Le, and
(c) ∆(◦,K) satisfies rational monotonicity; that is, if ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K) and ϕ→¬ξ 6∈ ∆(◦,K),
then ϕ ∧ ξ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
Proof: We start with part (a):
LLE Assume that ⊢Le ϕ ≡ ϕ
′ and that ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K). Thus, ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ. From R5, it
follows that ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ′, and thus ϕ′→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
RW Assume that ⊢Le ψ ⇒ ψ
′ and that ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K). Thus, ψ ∈ K ◦ϕ. Since K ◦ϕ is a
belief set, it is closed under logical consequence. In particular, ψ′ ∈ K ◦ ϕ, and hence
ϕ→ψ′ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
REF By R2, ϕ ∈ K ◦ ϕ, and thus, ϕ→ϕ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
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AND Assume that ϕ→ψ1, ϕ→ψ2 ∈ ∆(◦,K). Thus, ψ1, ψ2 ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Since K ◦ ϕ is a belief
set, ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Thus, ϕ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ ∆(◦,K).
OR Assume that ϕ1→ψ,ϕ2→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K). There are two cases. If K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) is
inconsistent, then ψ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) and thus ϕ1∨ϕ2→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K). If K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) is
consistent, then, by R2, ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2). Thus, we cannot have both ¬ϕ1 and
¬ϕ2 in K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). Without loss of generality, assume that ¬ϕ1 6∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2).
Using R7 and R8, we get that K ◦ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∧ ϕ1) = Cl(K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∪ {ϕ1}).
Using R6, we get that K ◦ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∧ ϕ1) = K ◦ ϕ1. Thus, we conclude that
K ◦ ϕ1 = Cl(K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∪ {ϕ1}). Since ϕ1→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K), we have that ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ1.
Thus, we get that ϕ1 ⇒ ψ ∈ K◦(ϕ1∨ϕ2). If ¬ϕ2 6∈ K◦(ϕ1∨ϕ2), by similar arguments
we get that ϕ2 ⇒ ψ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2). This implies that (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2)⇒ ψ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2),
and thus ψ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2). On the other hand, if ¬ϕ2 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), then, since
ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2), we get that ϕ1 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), and thus ψ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2).
CM Assume that ϕ→ψ1, ϕ→ψ2 ∈ ∆(◦,K). If K ◦ ϕ is inconsistent, then using R5 we get
that ϕ is inconsistent. Thus, ϕ∧ψ1 is inconsistent, so ψ2 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ∧ψ1). Now assume
that K ◦ ϕ is consistent. Since ϕ→ψ1, we have that ψ1 ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Since K ◦ ϕ is
consistent, we get that ¬ψ1 6∈ K ◦ϕ. Applying R8, we get that K ◦ϕ ⊆ K ◦ (ϕ∧ψ1).
Since ϕ→ψ2 ∈ ∆(◦,K), we have that ψ2 ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Thus, ψ2 ∈ K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ1). This
implies that (ϕ ∧ ψ1)→ψ2 ∈ ∆(◦,K).
We now prove part (b). Let ϕ ∈ Le be a consistent formula. Then, using R5, we get
that K ◦ ϕ is consistent. Thus, ϕ→false 6∈ ∆(◦,K).
Finally we prove part (c). Assume that ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K), and ϕ ∧ ξ→ψ 6∈ ∆(◦,K). Since
ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K), we have that ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Now if ¬ξ 6∈ K ◦ ϕ, then, using R8, we have that
Cl(K ◦ϕ∪{ξ}) ⊆ K ◦(ϕ∧ξ). This implies that ψ ∈ K ◦(ϕ∧ξ). However, since we assumed
that ϕ ∧ ξ→ψ 6∈ ∆(◦,K), we have that ψ 6∈ K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ξ); thus, we get a contradiction. We
conclude that ¬ξ ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Thus, ϕ→¬ξ ∈ ∆(◦,K). ⊓⊔
We now use this result to show that there exists a plausibility structure that corresponds
to ◦ applied to K.
Lemma A.2: Let ◦ be an AGM revision operator, and let K ⊆ Le be a consistent belief set.
Then there is a plausibility structure PL = (W,Pl, π) such that Pl is ranked, PL |= ϕ→ψ if
and only if ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ, and Pl([[ϕ]]) > ⊥ for all ⊢Le-consistent formulas ϕ ∈ Le.
Proof: We use the basic techniques described in the proof of (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b,
Theorem 8.2). Let ∆(◦,K) be the set of defaults defined by Lemma A.1. We now construct
a plausibility space PL′ = (W,Pl′, π) such that PL′ |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
We define PL′ as follows:
• W = {wV : V ⊆ Le is a maximal ⊢Le-consistent set},
• π(wV )(p) = true if p ∈ V , and
• Pl′([[ϕ]]) ≥ Pl′([[ψ]]) if and only if (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ϕ ∈ ∆(◦,K).
Using (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b, Lemma 4.1), we get that PL′ |= ϕ→ψ if and only if
ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K). From Lemma A.1 (c) and and results of (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b), it
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follows that there is a ranked plausibility measure Pl that is default-isomorphic to Pl′, that
is (W,Pl, π) satisfies precisely the same defaults as (W,Pl′, π). Let PL = (W,Pl, π).
Since PL is default-isomorphic to PL′, we have that PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ϕ→ψ ∈
∆(◦,K). Moreover, using Lemma A.1, we have that ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆(◦,K) if and only if ψ ∈ K ◦ϕ.
Thus, PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ψ ∈ K ◦ϕ. Finally, let ϕ be a ⊢Le-consistent formula. From
Lemma A.1 (b), we get that ϕ→false 6∈ ∆(◦,K). Since ∆(◦,K) is closed under the rules of
system P, we conclude that (ϕ ∨ false)→false 6∈ ∆(◦,K). Thus, Pl
′([[ϕ]]) 6≤ ⊥ = Pl′([[false]]),
and thus Pl′([[ϕ]]) > ⊥. Since Pl is default-isomorphic to Pl′, we conclude that Pl([[ϕ]]) > ⊥.
⊓⊔
We now prove the converse to Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.3: Let PL = (W,Pl, π) be a ranked plausibility structure such that π(w) is ⊢Le-
consistent for all worlds w, and PL 6|= ϕ→false for all ⊢Le-consistent formulas ϕ ∈ Le;
let K = {ϕ ∈ Le : PL |= true→ϕ}. Then there is an AGM revision operator ◦ such that
ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ if and only if PL |= ϕ→ψ.
Proof: Let ◦ be some belief change operation such that K ◦ ϕ = {ψ : PL |= ϕ→ψ}. Since
this requirement constrains only the result of applying ◦ to K, we can assume without loss
of generality that ◦ satisfies the AGM postulates when applied to belief sets other than K.
Thus, we need prove only that ◦ satisfies the AGM postulates for revision applied to K.
(Note that the proofs for R3 and R4 follow from the proofs for R7 and R8, respectively.)
R1 Since PL is qualitative, we have that {ψ : PL |= ϕ→ψ} is a belief set, that is, closed
under logical consequences.
R2 Axiom C1 implies that PL |= ϕ→ϕ. Thus, ϕ ∈ K ◦ ϕ.
R5 By our assumptions, if ϕ is ⊢Le-consistent, then Pl([[ϕ]]) > ⊥, and thus PL 6|= ϕ→false.
On the other hand, if ϕ is not ⊢Le-consistent, then [[ϕ]] = ∅, and thus Pl([[ϕ]]) = ⊥.
We conclude that Pl([[ϕ]]) = ⊥ if and only if ⊢Le ¬ϕ. This implies that PL |= ϕ→false
if and only if ⊢Le ¬ϕ. Thus, K ◦ ϕ = Cl(false) if and only if ⊢Le ¬ϕ.
R6 Assume that ⊢Le ϕ ⇔ ϕ
′. Then, by our assumption, π(w)(ϕ) = π(w)(ϕ′). Thus,
[[ϕ∧ψ]] = [[ϕ′ ∧ψ]] for all formulas ψ ∈ Le. We conclude that PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only
if PL |= ϕ′→ψ. This implies that K ◦ ϕ = K ◦ ϕ′.
R7 There are two cases: either Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) = ⊥ or Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) > ⊥. If Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) =
⊥, then ϕ ∧ ψ is inconsistent. According to R2, we have that ϕ ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Thus,
ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}). This implies that Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}) contains false, and thus
K ◦ (ϕ∧ψ) ⊆ Cl(K ◦ϕ∪{ψ}). If Pl([[ϕ∧ψ]]) > ⊥, let ξ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ∧ψ). We now show
that ξ ∈ Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}). This will show that K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}). Since
ξ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ), we get that PL |= (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ξ. Since Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) > ⊥, we get that
Pl([[ϕ∧ψ∧ξ]]) > Pl([[ϕ∧ψ∧¬ξ]]). Then we have that Pl([[ϕ∧(ψ ⇒ ξ)]]) > Pl([[ϕ∧¬(ψ ⇒
ξ))]]), since (ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ ξ) ⇒ (ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ξ)) and (ϕ ∧ ¬(ψ ⇒ ξ)) ⇒ (ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ ¬ξ). This
also implies that Pl([[ϕ]]) > ⊥. Thus, PL |= ϕ→(ψ ⇒ ξ). So, (ψ ⇒ ξ) ∈ K ◦ ϕ, and
thus ξ ∈ Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}).
R8 Assume that ¬ψ 6∈ K ◦ϕ. Let ξ ∈ Cl(K ◦ϕ∪{ψ}). We now show that ξ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ∧ψ).
This will show that Cl(K ◦ϕ∪{ψ}) ⊆ K ◦(ϕ∧ψ). Let A = [[ϕ∧¬ψ]], B = [[ϕ∧ψ∧ξ]],
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and C = [[ϕ ∧ ψ ∧ ¬ξ]]. It is easy to verify that these sets are pairwise disjoint. Since
ϕ∧ (ψ ⇒ ξ) ≡ (ϕ∧¬ψ)∨ (ϕ∧ψ ∧ ξ) and (ϕ∧¬(ψ ⇒ ξ)) ≡ (ϕ∧ψ ∧¬ξ), we conclude
that [[ϕ ∧ (ψ ⇒ ξ)]] = A ∪ B, and [[ϕ ∧ ¬(ψ ⇒ ξ)]] = C. Since ξ ∈ Cl(K ◦ ϕ ∪ {ψ}),
we have that (ψ ⇒ ξ) ∈ K ◦ ϕ. This means that PL |= ϕ→(ψ ⇒ ξ). Thus, either
Pl([[ϕ]]) = ⊥ or Pl(A∪B) > Pl(C). If Pl([[ϕ]]) = ⊥, then according to A1, we get that
Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) = ⊥. Thus, PL |= (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ξ vacuously, and ξ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ) as desired.
Now assume that Pl(A ∪ B) > Pl(C). Since Pl is ranked, it satisfies A4′ and A5′.
According to A5′, we get that either Pl(A) > Pl(C) or Pl(B) > Pl(C). Assume that
Pl(A) > Pl(C) and Pl(B) 6> Pl(C). Then, using A4′, we get that Pl(A) > Pl(B).
Applying A2, we get that Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C). However since A = [[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]] and
B ∪ C = [[ϕ ∧ ψ]], this implies that ¬ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ, which contradicts our assumption.
Thus, we conclude that Pl(B) > Pl(C). Since B = [[ϕ ∧ψ ∧ ξ]] and C = [[ϕ∧ ψ ∧¬ξ]],
we get that PL |= (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ξ, and thus ξ ∈ K ◦ (ϕ ∧ ψ).
R3 and R4 Our definition of ◦ implies that K ◦ true = K. According to R6, we have that
K ◦ (true∧ϕ) = K ◦ϕ. Combining these two facts, we get that R3 and R4 are special
cases of R7 and R8, respectively.
⊓⊔
These results show how to map between ranked plausibility structures and AGM revision
operators. We now relate systems in CR and ranked plausibility structures. Let I =
(R, π,P) ∈ CR. Recall that REV2 requires that the prior of I be a ranking. Thus, we
can construct a ranked plausibility structure where worlds are runs in R. We define the
characteristic structure of I to be PLI = (R,Pla, πPlI ), where Pla is the agent’s prior over
runs and πPlI (r)(p) = π(r, 0)(p) for all p ∈ Φe. Note that [[ϕ]]PLI = R[ϕ].
We now use PLI to describe the beliefs of the agent in each local state.
Lemma A.4: Let I ∈ CR and let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. Then ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and only if
PLI |= (
∧m
i=1 oi)→ϕ. (By convention, if m = 0, we take (
∧m
i=1 oi) to be true.)
Proof: Let I ∈ CR and let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. There are two cases: either sa is a local state
in I, or it is not.
If sa is a local state in I, suppose that ra(m) = sa. Note that ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and
only if Pl(r,m)([[ϕ]](r,m)) > Pl(r,m)([[¬ϕ]](r,m)). Recall that, according to the definition of
conditioning, Pl(r,m)(·) is isomorphic to Pla(·|R[·; o1, . . . , om]). Thus, Pl(r,m)([[ϕ]](r,m)) >
Pl(r,m)([[¬ϕ]](r,m)) if and only if Pla(R[ϕ] | R[·; o1, . . . , om]) > Pla(R[¬ϕ] | R[·; o1, . . . , om]).
Using C1, this is true if and only if Pla(R[ϕ; o1, . . . , om]) > Pla(R[¬ϕ; o1, . . . , om]). Using
REV4, this is true if and only if Pla(R[ϕ ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]) > Pla(R[¬ϕ ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]). We get that
ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and only if Pla(R[ϕ ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]) > Pla(R[¬ϕ ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]). This implies that
ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and only if PLI |= (
∧m
i=1 oi)→ϕ.
If sa is not a local state in I, thenR[·; o1, . . . , om] = ∅, and by definition Pla(R[·; o1, . . . , om]) =
⊥. Using C1 and REV4, we get that PLa(R[
∧m
i=1 oi]) = ⊥, and thus PLI |= (
∧m
i=1 oi)→ϕ
for all ϕ ∈ Le. Since sa is not a local state in I, by definition Bel(I, sa) = Le. Hence, we
can conclude that ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and only if PLI |= (
∧m
i=1 oi)→ϕ. ⊓⊔
We now show that given a ranked plausibility structure PL we can construct a system
whose characteristic structure is default-isomorphic to PL.
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Lemma A.5: Let PLK = (WK ,PlK , πK) be a plausibility space that satisfies the conditions
of Lemma A.3. Then there is a system I ∈ CR such that PLI = PLK .
Proof: Let PLK = (WK ,PlK , πK) be a plausibility space that satisfies the conditions of
Lemma A.3. For each world w ∈ WK and sequence of observations o1, o2, . . ., let r
w,o1,o2,...
be the run defined so that rw,o1,o2,...e (m) = w and r
w,o1,o2,...
a (m) = 〈o1, . . . , om〉 for all m. Let
R = {rw,o1,o2,... : πk(w)(oi) = true for all i}. Define π so that π(r,m)(p) = πK(re(m))(p)
for p ∈ Φe, and so that π(r,m)(learn(ϕ)) = true if o(r,m) = ϕ for ϕ ∈ Le. Finally, define
the prior plausibility Pla so that Pla(R) = PlK({w : ∃r ∈ R(w = re(0))}. It is easy to check
that this definition implies that Pla(R[ϕ]) = PlK([[ϕ]]PLK ). Thus, PLI = PLK . Since PlK
is a ranking, Pla is also a ranking and thus qualitative.
We now verify that the resulting interpreted system is indeed in CR. It is easy to
check that I is a belief change system; that is, it satisfies BCS1–BCS5. The construction
is such that re(m) = re(0) for all runs r and times m. Thus, I satisfies REV1. Since
the prior Pla is a ranking, this system also satisfies REV2. Lemma A.2 implies that if ϕ
is a consistent formula, then PlK([[ϕ]]PLK ) > ⊥. This implies that Pla(R[ϕ]) > ⊥, and
thus the system satisfies REV3. Finally, it is easy to show that Pla(R[ϕ; o1, . . . , om]) =
Pla(R[ϕ ∧ o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]) = PlK([[ϕ ∧ o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om]]PLK ). Thus, the system satisfies REV4.
⊓⊔
We are finally ready to prove Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2: Let ◦ be an AGM revision operator and let K ⊆ Le be a consistent belief
set. Then there is a system I(◦,K) ∈ C
R such that Bel(I(◦,K), 〈〉) = K and
Bel(I(◦,K), 〈〉) ◦ ϕ = Bel(I(◦,K), 〈ϕ〉)
for all ϕ ∈ Le.
Proof: Let ◦ be an AGM revision operator and let K ⊆ Le be a consistent belief set. By
Lemmas A.2 and A.5, there is a system I(◦,K) = (R(◦,K), π(◦,K),P(◦,K)) ∈ C
R such that
PLI(◦,K) |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ. Our construction is such that ψ ∈ K ◦ ϕ if and
only if PLI(◦,K) |= ϕ→ψ. Using Lemma A.4, we get that PLI(◦,K) |= ϕ→ψ if and only if
ψ ∈ Bel(I(◦,K), 〈ϕ〉). Thus, K ◦ ϕ = Bel(I(◦,K), 〈ϕ〉).
Finally, we show Bel(I(◦,K), 〈〉) = K. We start by showing that K ◦true = K. Using R3,
we get that K ◦ true ⊆ Cl(K∪{true}) = K. Since K is consistent, by R4, Cl(K∪{true}) ⊆
K ◦ true. Thus, K ◦ true = K. By Lemma A.4, we have that Bel(I, 〈〉) = Bel(I, 〈true〉).
Since Bel(I, 〈true〉) = K ◦ true, we conclude that Bel(I(◦,K), 〈〉) = K. ⊓⊔
We next prove Theorem 5.3.
Theorem 5.3: Let I be a system in CR. Then there is an AGM revision operator ◦I such
that
Bel(I, 〈〉) ◦I ϕ = Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉)
for all ϕ ∈ Le.
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Proof: Let I = (R, π,P) be a system in CR. It is easy to verify that PLI satisfies the
conditions of Lemma A.3 with K = Bel(I, 〈〉). This lemma implies that there is a revision
operator ◦I such that ψ ∈ K ◦I ϕ if and only if PLI |= ϕ→ψ. Using Lemma A.4, we have
that ψ ∈ Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉) if and only if PlI |= ϕ→ψ. Thus, we have that K ◦I ϕ = Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉)
for all formulas ϕ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.4: Let I be a system in CR and sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉 be a local state in I. Then
there is an AGM revision operator ◦I,sa such that
Bel(I, sa) ◦I,sa ϕ = Bel(I, sa · ϕ)
for all formulas ϕ ∈ Le such that o1 ∧ . . . om ∧ ϕ is consistent.
Proof: The structure of the proof is similar to that of Theorem 5.3. As in that proof,
we construct a ranked plausibility structure and use Lemma A.3 to find an AGM revision
operator. The main difference is that after observing ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, some events are considered
impossible. Lemma A.3, however, requires that all possible formulas are assigned a positive
plausibility. We overcome this problem by assigning a “fictional” positive plausibility to all
non-empty events that are ruled out by the previous observations.
We proceed as follows. Let d0 be a new plausibility value that is less plausible than
all positive plausibilities in Pla; that is, if Pla(A) > ⊥, then Pla(A) > d0. Let I =
(R, π,P) ∈ CR; let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. We define PL = (R,Pl, πPLI ), where Pl is such that
Pl([[ϕ]]) = max(Pla(R[ϕ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]), d0) for all consistent formulas ϕ. This definition implies
that if ϕ is consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi, then Pl([[ϕ]]PL) = Pla(R[ϕ1 ∧
∧m
i=1 oi]).
We now prove that if ϕ is consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi, then PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if
PLI |= (ϕ ∧
∧m
i=1 oi)→ψ.
For the “if” part, assume that PLI |= (ϕ∧
∧m
i=1 oi)→ψ. Since ϕ is consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi
it follows, from REV3, that Pla(R[ϕ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi])) > ⊥. Thus, Pla(R[(ϕ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi))∧ψ]) >
Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]) ≥ ⊥. Thus, ϕ ∧ ψ is consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi. This implies
that Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) = Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ψ] > max(d0,Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]) =
Pl([[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]]). We conclude that PL |= ϕ→ψ.
For the “only if” part, assume that PLI 6|= (ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi))→ψ. This implies that
Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ψ]) 6> Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]). Since Pla is a ranking, it
follows that Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi))ψ]) ≤ Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]). Since ⊥ < Pla(R[ϕ ∧
(
∧m
i=1 oi)]) = max(Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ψ]),Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ])), we have that
Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]) > ⊥. We conclude that Pl([[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]]) ≥ Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]). Thus,
PL 6|= ϕ→ψ.
It is easy to verify that PL is ranked, and satisfies the requirements of Lemma A.3. Thus,
there exists a revision operator ◦I,sa such that ψ ∈ K ◦I,sa ϕ if and only if PL |= ϕ→ψ,
where K = {ϕ : PL |= true→ϕ}. Moreover, since for all ϕ consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi we have
thatPL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if PLI |= (ϕ∧ (
∧m
i=1 oi))→ψ, then, from Lemma A.4, it follows
that K = Bel(I, sa) and that if ϕ is consistent with
∧m
i=1 oi, then PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only
if ψ ∈ Bel(I, sa · ϕ). ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.5: Let I be a system in CR whose local states are ELe. There is a function
BelI that maps epistemic states to belief states such that
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• if sa is a local state of the agent in I, then Bel(I, sa) = BelI(sa), and
• (◦,BelI) satisfies R1
′–R8′.
Proof: As we said earlier, roughly speaking, we define BelI(sa) = Bel(I, sa) when sa is a
local state in I. If sa is not in I, then we set BelI(sa) = Bel(I, s
′), where s′ is the longest
consistent suffix of sa. We now make this definition precise, and show that the resulting
BelI satisfies R1
′–R8′.
We proceed as follows. We define a function f(·) that maps sequences of observations
to suffixes as follows:
f(〈o1, . . . , om〉) =


〈〉 if m = 0,
〈false〉 if m > 0 and om is inconsistent,
〈ok, . . . , om〉 otherwise, with k ≤ m the minimal index
s. t. 6⊢Le ¬(ok ∧ . . . ∧ om).
Aside from the special case where om is inconsistent, we simply choose the longest suffix of
sa that is still consistent. We define BelI(sa) = Bel(I, f(sa)). Clearly, if sa is a local state
in I, then f(sa) = sa, so BelI(sa) = Bel(I, sa).
We now have to show that (◦,BelI) satisfies R1
′–R8′. The proof outline is as follows.
Given a particular state sa, we construct a ranked plausibility structure that corresponds,
in the sense of Lemma A.2, to belief change from sa. We then use Lemma A.3 to show that
belief changes from sa satisfies the AGM postulates, i.e., R1–R8. Since this is true from
any sa, we get that BelI satisfies R1
′–R8′.
Let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. We define a ranked plausibility space that has the following
structure. The most plausible events are the ones consistent with o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om. They are
ordered according to the prior ranking conditioned on o1 ∧ . . .∧ om. The next tier of events
are those that are inconsistent with o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om but are consistent o2 ∧ . . . ∧ om. Again,
these are ordered according to the prior ranking conditioned on o2 ∧ . . . ∧ om. We continue
this way; the last tier consists of all events that are inconsistent with om.
Formally, let PL = (R,Pl, πPLI ), where Pl is such that Pl([[ϕ]]) ≥ Pl([[ψ]]) if Pla(R[ϕ ∧
(
∧m
i=k oi])) ≥ Pla(R[ψ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi])) where k ≤ m+1 is the greatest integer such that for all
j < k, ϕ and ψ are both inconsistent with
∧m
i=j oi. It is easy to see that PL is ranked, and
that if ϕ is consistent, then Pl([[ϕ]]) > ⊥.
Let ϕ ∈ Le. We now show that PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ψ ∈ BelI(sa · ϕ). If ϕ is
inconsistent, then PL |= ϕ→ψ for all ψ. Moreover, since ϕ is inconsistent, f(sa·ϕ) = 〈false〉,
and thus BelI(sa · ϕ) = Le. We conclude that ϕ→ψ if and only if ψ ∈ BelI(sa · ϕ). If ϕ is
consistent, then let k ≤ m+1 be the greatest integer such that for all j < k, ϕ is inconsistent
with
∧m
i=j oi. It is easy to verify that f(sa ·ϕ) = 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ〉. From Lemma A.4, it follows
that ψ ∈ BelI(sa · ϕ) = Bel(I, 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ〉) if and only if Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ψ]) >
Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧¬ψ]). We now show that this is the case if and only if PL |= ϕ→ψ.
Suppose that PLa(R[(ϕ ∧ ∧(
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ψ]) > PLa(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]). Then, clearly,
Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ψ]) > ⊥, and thus ϕ ∧ ψ is consistent with ok, . . . , om. Since both
ϕ∧ψ and ϕ∧¬ψ are inconsistent with oj , . . . , om for all j < k, we have that Pl([[ϕ∧ψ]]) >
Pl([[ϕ∧¬ψ]]). On other hand, if Pla(R[(ϕ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi))∧ψ]) 6> Pla(R[(ϕ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi))∧¬ψ]),
then since Pla is a ranking PLa(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ψ]) ≤ PLa(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]).
Moreover, since ϕ is consistent with ok ∧ . . . ∧ om, we have that Pla(R[ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)]) > ⊥.
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This implies that Pla(R[(ϕ ∧ (
∧m
i=k oi)) ∧ ¬ψ]) > ⊥ and thus Pl([[ϕ ∧ ψ]]) ≤ Pl([[ϕ ∧ ¬ψ]]).
We conclude that PL |= ϕ→ψ if and only if ψ ∈ BelI(sa · ϕ).
By Lemma A.3, there is a revision operator ◦sa that satisfies R1–R8 such that ψ ∈ K ◦ϕ
if and only if PL |= ϕ→ψ. It is not hard to check that this implies that the change from
BelI(sa) to BelI(sa · ϕ) satisfies R1
′–R8′. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5.6: Let I be a system in CR whose local states are ELe. There is a function
BelI that maps epistemic states to belief states such that
• if sa is a local state of the agent in I, then Bel(I, sa) = BelI(sa), and
• (◦,BelI) satisfies R1
′–R9′.
Proof: As we said in the main text, we show that the function BelI defined in the proof of
Theorem 5.5 satisfies R9′. Let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉, and let ϕ,ψ ∈ Le be formulas such that
6⊢Le ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ). Since ϕ is consistent with ψ, we get that f(sa · ϕ · ψ) = 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ, ψ〉,
where k ≤ m is the least integer such that ϕ∧ψ is consistent with ok, . . . , om. For the same
reason, we get that f(sa · ϕ ∧ ψ) = 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ ∧ ψ〉. Using Lemma A.4 we immediately
get that Bel(I, 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ, ψ〉) = Bel(I, 〈ok, . . . , om, ϕ ∧ ψ〉). Thus, we conclude that
BelI(sa · ϕ · ψ) = BelI(sa · ϕ ∧ ψ). ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.7: Given a function BelLe mapping epistemic states in ELe to belief sets over
Le such that BelLe(〈〉) is consistent and (BelLe , ◦) satisfies R1
′–R9′, there is a system I ∈ CR
whose local states are in ELe such that BelLe(sa) = Bel(I, sa) for each local state sa in I.
Proof: We show that Bel(I, sa) = BelLe(sa) for local states sa in I, where I is the system
guaranteed to exist by Theorem 5.2 such that Bel(I, 〈〉) = BelLe(〈〉) and Bel(I, 〈ϕ〉) =
BelLe(〈ϕ〉) for all ϕ ∈ Le. We prove this by induction on the length m of sa. For
m ≤ 1, this is true by our choice of I. For the induction case, let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉
be a local state in I. Thus,, o1 ∧ . . . ∧ om is consistent. From R9
′, it follows that
BelLe(〈o1, . . . , om〉) = BelLe(〈o1, . . . , om−2, om−1 ∧ om〉). Using the induction hypothesis,
we have that BelLe(〈o1, . . . , om−2, om−1 ∧ om〉) = Bel(I, 〈o1, . . . , om−2, om−1 ∧ om〉). Using
Lemma A.4, we get that Bel(I, 〈o1, . . . , om−2, om−1 ∧ om〉) = Bel(I, 〈o1, . . . , om〉). Thus, we
conclude that BelLe(〈o1, . . . , om〉) = Bel(I, 〈o1, . . . , om〉). ⊓⊔
A.2 Proofs for Section 6
In this section we prove Theorem 6.2. We now show that any system in CU corresponds to
an update structure. Suppose that I = (R, π,P) ∈ CU is such that the set of environment
states is Se and the prior of BCS5 is consistent with distance function d. Define an update
structure UI = (Se, πe, d), where for p ∈ Φe, πe(se)(p) = π((se, sa))(p) for some choice of
sa. By BCS1, the choice of sa does not matter. It is easy to see that UPD1 ensures that
Se and πe satisfy the requirements of the definition of update structures. We want to show
that belief change in I corresponds to belief change in UI in the sense of Theorem 6.1.
Since Theorem 6.1 states that any belief change operation defined by an update structure
satisfies U1–U8, this will suffice to prove the “if” direction of Theorem 6.2. To prove the
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“only if” direction of Theorem 6.2, we show that that for any update structure U , there is
a system I ∈ CU such that UI = U .
We start with preliminary definitions and lemmas for the “if” direction of Theorem 6.2.
Let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. We define States(I, sa) = {s ∈ Se : s |= ξ for all ξ ∈ Bel(I, sa)}.
Clearly, if ϕ is such that Bel(I, sa) = Cl(ϕ), then States(I, sa) = [[ϕ]]UI . To show that
belief change in I corresponds to belief change in UI we have to show that
States(I, sa · ψ) = minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ).
This is proved in Lemma A.8. To prove this lemma, we need some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma A.6: Let I ∈ CU , and let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. Then ϕ ∈ Bel(I, sa) if and only if
(I, r, 0) |= (©o1 ∧ . . . ∧©
mom)→©
mϕ for some run r in R.
Proof: The proof of this lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma A.4, using UPD3 and
UPD4 instead of REV3 and REV4. We do not repeat the argument here. ⊓⊔
We now provide an alternative characterization of States(I, sa) in terms of the agent’s
prior on run-prefixes.
Lemma A.7: Let I ∈ CU and let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. Then sm ∈ States(I, sa) if and only if
there is a sequence of states [s0, . . . , sm] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om] such that Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6<
Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om]− [s0, . . . , sm]).
Proof: For the “if” direction, assume that there is a sequence s0, . . . , sm such that
[s0, . . . , sm] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om], and Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6< Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om] −
[s0, . . . , sm]). By way of contradiction, assume that sm 6∈ States(I,m). Thus, there is a for-
mula ξ ∈ Bel(I,m) such that sm |= ¬ξ. From Lemma A.6 it follows that since ξ ∈ Bel(I, sa),
(I, r, 0) |= (©o1∧ . . .∧©
mom)→©
mξ for some run r in R. From the definition of condition-
ing it follows that Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ξ]) > Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ¬ξ]).
Since sm |= ¬ξ, we get that [s0, . . . , sm] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ¬ξ] and that
R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ξ] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om] − [s0, . . . , sm]. From A1, it follows that
Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) < Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om] − [s0, . . . , sm]), which contradicts our starting
assumption. We conclude that sm ∈ States(I, sa).
For the “only if” direction, assume that sm ∈ States(I, a). Since Se is finite and πe
assigns a different truth assignment to each state in Se, there is a formula ξ ∈ Le that
characterizes sm; that is, s |= ξ if and only if s = sm. Since sm ∈ States(I, sa), we have that
¬ξ 6∈ Bel(I, sa). Using Lemma A.6, we get that (I, r, 0) 6|= (©o1 ∧ . . . ∧©
mom)→©
m¬ξ
for all runs r ∈ R. By BCS5, this is true if and only if Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om]) > ⊥
and Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ξ]) 6< Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ¬ξ]). By UPD2,
there is a sequence [s0, . . . , sm] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ξ] such that Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6<
Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m]) for all [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om∧¬ξ]. Moreover, without loss
of generality, we can assume that Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m]) for all [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m] ⊆
R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om ∧ ξ], since there are only finitely many such sequences. Thus, by
UPD2, Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6< Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om]− [s0, . . . , sm]). ⊓⊔
We can now prove that belief change in I corresponds to belief change in UI .
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Lemma A.8: Let I = (R, π,P) ∈ CU Then
States(I, sa · ψ) = minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI )
for all local states sa and formulas ψ ∈ Le.
Proof: Let Pla be the prior in I; assume that Pla consistent with a distance function d.
Let sa = 〈o1, . . . , om〉.
To show that minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ) ⊆ States(I, sa · ψ), suppose that s ∈
minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ). Thus, there is a state sm ∈ States(I, sa) such that d(sm, s
′) 6<
d(sm, s) for all states s
′ that satisfy ψ. We want to show that s ∈ States(I, sa ·
ψ). From Lemma A.7, it follows that, since sm ∈ States(I, sa), there is a sequence
s0, . . . , sm−1 such that [s0, . . . , sm] ∈ R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om] and Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6<
Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om−1, om] − [s0, . . . , sm]). We now show that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6<
Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] − [s0, . . . , sm, s]). By Lemma A.7, this suffices to show that
s ∈ States(I, sa · ψ). Suppose that [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m+1] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] − [s0, . . . , sm, s].
If [s0, . . . , sm] = [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m], then we have that d(s
′
m, s
′
m+1) 6< d(sm, s). Since Pla is con-
sistent with d, it follows that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m, s
′
m+1]). If [s0, . . . , sm] 6=
[s′0, . . . , s
′
m], then, since Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m]) and Pla is consistent with d,
we have that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m, s
′
m+1]).
Since Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m, s
′
m+1])
for all [s′0, . . . , s
′
m+1] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] − [s0, . . . , sm, s] and Pla is prefix-defined, we
have that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] − [s0, . . . , sm, s]. By Lemma A.7,
s ∈ States(I, sa · ψ), as desired.
To show that States(I, sa · ψ) ⊆ minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ), suppose that s ∈
States(I, sa · ψ). By Lemma A.7, there is a sequence s0, . . . , sm such that [s0, . . . , sm, s]) ⊆
R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] and Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ] − [s0, . . . , sm, s]).
We want to show that sm ∈ States(I, sa) and that d(sm, s
′) 6< d(sm, s) for all s
′ that satisfy
ψ. This suffices to prove that s ∈ minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ).
To show that sm ∈ States(I, sa), by Lemma A.7, it suffices to show that Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6<
Pla(R[true, o1, . . . , om]− [s0, . . . , sm]). Let s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m be a sequence such that [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m] ⊆
R[true, o1, . . . , om]. By definition, [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m, s] ⊆ R[true, o1, . . . , om, ψ]. Thus, from our
choice of s0, . . . , sm, it follows that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m, s]). Since Pla is
consistent with d, it follows that Pla([s0, . . . , sm]) 6< Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
m]). Thus, by Lemma A.7,
sm ∈ States(I, sa). To see that d(sm, s
′) 6< d(sm, s) for all s
′ that satisfy ψ, let s′ 6= s be such
that s′ |= ψ. Thus, [s0, . . . , sm, s
′] ⊆ [true, o1, . . . , om, ψ]. From our choice of s0, . . . , sm,
it follows that Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s]) 6< Pla([s0, . . . , sm, s
′]). Since Pla is consistent with d, it
follows that d(sm, s
′) 6< d(sm, s). We conclude that s ∈ minUI (States(I, sa), [[ψ]]UI ). ⊓⊔
We now have the tools to prove the “if” direction of Theorem 6.2.
Lemma A.9: If I = (R, π,P) ∈ CU , then there is a belief change operator ⋄ that satisfies
U1–U8 such that
Bel(I, sa) ⋄ ψ = Bel(I, sa · ψ)
for all local states sa and formulas ψ ∈ Le.
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Proof: Let I ∈ CU . Using the arguments we presented above, it easy to check that UI
is an update structure. By Theorem 6.1, there is a belief change operator ⋄ that satisfies
U1–U8 such that [[ϕ ⋄ ψ]]UI = minUI ([[ϕ]]UI , [[ψ]]UI ) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Le. From Lemma A.8, it
follows that Bel(I, sa) ⋄ ψ = Bel(I, sa · ψ). ⊓⊔
We now prove the “only if” direction of Theorem 6.2. Suppose that ⋄ is a belief change
operator that satisfies U1–U8. According to Theorem 6.1, there is an update structure U⋄
that corresponds to ⋄. Thus, it suffices to show that there is a system I such that UI = U⋄.
Lemma A.10: Let U = (W,d, πU ) be an update structure. Then there is a system I ∈ C
U
such that UI = U .
Proof: Given the sequences w0, w1, . . . ∈ W and o1, o2, . . . ∈ Le, let r
w0,w1,...;o1,o2,... be the
run defined so that rw0,w1,...;o1,o2,...e (m) = wm and r
w0,w1,...;o1,o2,...
a (m) = 〈o1, . . . , om〉. Let
R = {rw0,w1,...;o1,o2,... : πU (wm)(om) = true for all m}. Define π such that π(r,m)(p) =
πU (re(m))(p) for p ∈ Φe and π(r,m)(learn(ϕ)) = true if o(r,m) = ϕ for ϕ ∈ Le.
It is clear that (R, π) satisfies BCS1–BCS4 and UPD1. Thus, all that remains to show
is that there is a prior plausibility measure Pla that satisfies UPD2–UPD4. This will ensure
that (R, π,P) ∈ CU .
We proceed as follows. We define a preferential space (R,≺) where r ≺ r′ if and only
if there is some m such that re(k) = r
′
e(k) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ m, re(m + 1) 6= r
′
e(m + 1), and
d(re(m), re(m+1)) < d(r
′
e(m), r
′
e(m+1)). Recall that r ≺ r
′ denotes that r is preferred over
r′. Thus, this ordering is consistent with the comparison of events of the form [s0, . . . , sn]
according to UPD2.
Using the construction of Proposition 2.2, there is a plausibility space (R,Pla) such that
Pla(A) ≥ Pla(B) if and only if for all r ∈ B −A, there is a run r
′ ∈ A such that r′ ≺ r and
there is no r′′ ∈ B − A such that r′′ ≺ r′. By (Friedman & Halpern, 1998b, Theorem 5.5),
Pla is a qualitative plausibility measure. We now show that it satisfies UPD2–UPD4.
We start with UPD2. To show that PlA is consistent with d, we need to show that
Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) < Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]) if and only if there is some m < n such that sk = s
′
k
for all 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and d(sm, sm+1) > d(s
′
m, s
′
m+1). Suppose that Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) <
Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]). Let r be some run in [s0, . . . ,
′
n ]. Without loss of generality we can assume
that re(m) = re(n) for all m > n. Since Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) < Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]), there is a run
r′ ∈ [s′0, . . . , s
′
n] such that r
′ ≺ r. By definition, this implies that there is an m such that
re(k) = r
′
e(k) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and d(r
′
e(m), r
′
e(m+ 1)) < d(re(m), re(m+ 1)). We claim
that m < n. For if m ≥ n, then re(m+1) = re(m) by construction, so d(re(m), re(m+1)) =
d(re(m), re(m)) ≤ d(r
′
e(m), r
′
e(m + 1)) and r
′ 6≺ r, a contradiction. Thus, sk = s
′
k for all
0 ≤ k ≤ m, d(s′m, s
′
m+1) < d(sm, sm+1).
For the converse, suppose that there is an m < n such that sk = s
′
k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ m,
and d(s′m, s
′
m+1) < d(sm, sm+1). Let r
′ be the run where r′e(k) = s
′
k for k ≤ n, r
′
e(k) = s
′
n
for k ≥ n, and o(r′,k) = true for all k. It follows r
′ ≺ r for all runs r′ ∈ [s0, . . . , sn]. Thus,
Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) < Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]).
To show that Pla is prefix-defined, we must show that Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψn])
if and only if for all [s0, . . . , sn] ⊆ R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]−R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn], there is some [s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n] ⊆
R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn] such that Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]) > Pla([s0, . . . , sn]). Suppose that Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) ≥
Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]). Let [s0, . . . , sn] ⊆ R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]−R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]. Let r ∈ [s0, . . . , sn] be
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a run such that re(m) = re(n) for all m ≥ n. Since Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψn])
there is a run r′ ∈ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn] such that r
′ ≺ r. This implies that there is an m such
that re(k) = r
′
e(k) for all 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and d(r
′
e(m), r
′
e(m + 1)) < d(re(m), re(m + 1)).
As before, we have that m < n, and thus Pla([r
′
e(0), . . . , r
′
e(n)]) > Pla([s0, . . . , sn]). Since
r′ ∈ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn], we also have that [r
′
e(0), . . . , r
′
e(n)] ⊆ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn], as desired.
For the converse, assume that for all [s0, . . . , sn] ⊆ R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]−R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn] there
is some [s′0, . . . , s
′
n] ⊆ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn] such that Pla([s
′
0, . . . , s
′
n]) > Pla([s0, . . . , sn]). This im-
plies that Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) > Pla([s0, . . . , sn]) for all for all [s0, . . . , sn] ⊆ R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]−
R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]. Since there are only finitely many sequences of states of length m, we can ap-
ply A2, and conclude that Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) > Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψn]−R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]). Thus,
Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn]) ≥ Pla((R[ψ0, . . . , ψn])).
For UPD3, recall that the construction of Proposition 2.2 is such that Pla(R) > ⊥ for
all non-empty R ⊆ R. Since, by our construction, the set R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn] is non-empty for
all sequences ϕ0, . . . , ϕn of consistent formulas, UPD3 must hold.
Finally, we consider UPD4. We have to show that Pla(R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn+1; o1, . . . , on]) ≥
Pla(R[ψ0, . . . , ψn+1; o1, . . . , on]) if and only if Pla(R[ϕ0, ϕ1∧o1, . . . , ϕn∧on, ϕn+1]) ≥ Pla(R[ψ0, ψ1∧
o1, . . . , ψn∧on, ψn+1]). By construction,R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn+1; o1, . . . , on] ⊆ R[ϕ0, ϕ1∧o1, . . . , ϕn∧
on, ϕn+1]. On the other hand, for each run r ∈ R[ϕ0, ϕ1 ∧ o1, . . . , ϕn ∧ on, ϕn+1] there is
a run r′ ∈ R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn+1; o1, . . . , on] such that r
′
e(m) = re(m) for all m, and o(r,m) = om
for 1 ≤ m ≤ n. Since the preference ordering on runs is a function only of the environ-
ment states, it is clear that r and r′ are compared in the same manner; that is for all
r′′, r′′ ≺ r if and only if r′′ ≺ r′, and r ≺ r′′ if and only if r′ ≺ r′′. Thus, we conclude
that for the purposes of the preference ordering, both R[ϕ0, ϕ1 ∧ o1, . . . , ϕn ∧ on, ϕn+1] and
R[ϕ0, . . . , ϕn+1; o1, . . . , on] are compared in the same manner to other sets. It easy to see
that this suffices to show that Pla satisfies UPD4. ⊓⊔
Finally, we can prove Theorem 6.2.
Theorem 6.2: A belief change operator ⋄ satisfies U1–U8 if and only if there is a system
I ∈ CU such that
Bel(I, sa) ⋄ ψ = Bel(I, sa · ψ)
for all epistemic states sa and formulas ψ ∈ Le.
Proof: The “if” direction follows from Lemma A.9. For the “only if” direction, assume that
⋄ satisfies U1–U8. By Theorem 6.1, there is an update structure U⋄ such that [[ϕ ⋄ ψ]]UI =
minUI ([[ϕ]]UI , [[ψ]]UI ) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ Le. By Lemma A.10, there is a system I ∈ C
U such that
UI = U⋄. From Lemma A.8, it follows that Bel(I, sa) ⋄ψ = Bel(I, sa ·ψ) for all local states
sa and formulas ψ ∈ Le. ⊓⊔
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